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THE CULTURAL DEFENSE AND THE PROBLEM OF
CULTURAL PREEMPTION: A FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYSIS
NANCY S. KIM*
I. INTRODUCTION
-In 1985, in Santa Monica, California, Fumiko Kimura walked into the
ocean with her two children after learning of her husband's adulterous affair.
She was rescued, but her two children drowned. Kimura claimed that her
actions constituted the traditional Japanese practice of oya-ko shinju, or
parent-child suicide.'
-In 1985, Moua, a Hmong tribesman from Laos, abducted a Hmong woman
and had sexual relations with her despite her protests. 2 At trial, the defendant
argued that his actions were consistent with the Hmong tribal practice of zij
poj niam, or marriage by capture. The defense attorney claimed that in the
marriage by capture ritual, a man abducts a woman and takes her to his
family's home where he consummates the marriage. The woman is expected
to protest the man's sexual advances as a testament to her virtuousness.
* University of California, Berkeley (A.B., 1987; J.D., 1990), University of California, Los Angeles
(LL.M. 1993). Ms. Kim is a corporate attorney in San Francisco.
The author would like to thank Seth Burns, Robert Retana, Cecilia Toman, and the staff of the University
of New Mexico Law Review for their helpful comments and suggestions on drafts of this paper. Special thanks
to Seth Burns for his wisdom, support, and understanding during the writing process.
1. See Taryn F. Goldstein, Comment, Cultural Conflicts in Court: Should the American Criminal Justice
System Formally Recognize a "Cultural Defense"?, 99 DICK. L. REV. 141, 141, 147, 148 (1994) (citing People
v. Kimura, No. A-091133 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Nov. 21, 1985) (unpublished decision)); see also Alison
Dundes Rentein, A Justification of the Cultural Defense as Partial Excuse, 2 S. CAL REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.
437, 462, 463-64, 519 (1993) (citing and discussing the Kimura case); Note, The Cultural Defense in the
Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L REv. 1293. 1293 & n.1, 1295 & n.%w, 1304-07 (1986) [hereinafter Cultural
Defense] (same).
For an in-depth discussion of oya-ko shinju and its cultural and legal issues, see Taimie L. Bryant, Oya-ko
Shinju: Death at the Center of the Heart. 8 UCLA PACIFIC BASIN L.J. 1 (1990); Yuko Kawanishi, Japanese
Mother-Child Joint Suicide: The Psychological and Sociological Implications of the Kimura Case, 8 UCLA
PACIFIC BASIN L.J. 32 (1990); Carolyn Choi, Application of a Cultural Defense in Criminal Proceedings, 8
UCLA PACIFIC BASIN LJ. 80 (1990).
Oya-ko shinju is spelled "oyako-shinju" by some commentators. See, e.g., Rentein, supra; Cultural Defense,
supra. This Article uses the first spelling.
2. See Daina C. Chiu, Comment, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, and Guilty
Liberalism, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1053, 1114-15 (1994) (citing People v. (Kong) Moua, Case No. 315972-0 (Fresno
Super. Ct. 1985) (unpublished decision)); see also, Renteln, supra note 1, at 445 n.19, 484-85, 519 (citing and
discussing the Moua case); Cultural Defense, supra note 1, at 1294 n.9 (same). For a full analysis of the Moua
case, see Deidre Evans-Pritchard & Alison Dundes Renteln, The Interpretation and Distortion of Culture: A
Hmong "Marriage by Capture" Case in Fresno, California, 4 S. CA.. INTERDISC. LJ. 1 (1994). For another
case involving the Hmong culture, see John C. Lyman, Note, Cultural Defense: Viable Doctrine or Wishful
Thinking?, 9 CRim. JusT. J. 87, 94 & n.35 (1986) (citing People v. (Tou) Moua, No. F-90834-3 (Fresno Mun.
Ct. 1985), No. 328-106-0 (Fresno County 1985)); see also Cultural Defense, supra note 1, at 1293, 1306
(Hmong tribal member, exercising an alleged tribal right, executed his adulterous wife); Dick Polman, When is
Cultural Difference a Legal Defense? Immigrants' Native Traditions Clash with U.S. Law, SEATrLE TIMES, July
12, 1989, at Al, available in WESTLAW, Allnews database, 1989 WL 2933827, at *5-*6.
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The man shows that he is worthy of being her husband by continuing his
sexual advances despite her protestations
-In 1987, in Brooklyn, New York, Dong Lu Chen confronted his wife about
their sexual relationship. When she told him that she was having an affair, he
hit her eight times in the head with a claw hammer, killing her. At trial, an
expert for the defense testified that in traditional Chinese culture, a wife's
adultery is proof of her husband's weak character and that divorce is
considered a great shame upon one's ancestors.4
-In April, 1992, five friends from a Buddhist youth group helped their
friend, Binh Gia Pham, douse himself with gasoline and set himself on fire.
"The [forty-three] year-old immigrant was protesting attempts by the
Vietnamese government to suppress Buddhism."5 Pham's friends recorded his
death with video cameras, and then reported the incident to the police, not
realizing that aiding a suicide was a crime.6
-On April 27, 1994, Wen Sheng Hsieh was shot and killed in a restaurant
that he owned. The attorneys for the defendant, Yi Ching Chou, argued that
Chou was driven to seek revenge after a beating by Hsieh a year earlier. The
defendant's attorneys argued that the "loss of face" resulting from the beating
was further compounded by Hsieh ordering Chou out of the restaurant on the
day of the shooting.7
The increasing cultural diversity of the United States population has spawned a
variety of novel legal issues. The above examples illustrate the dilemma faced by
the criminal justice system in determining an accused's culpability. How should
the court treat a defendant accused of committing a crime that may have been
culturally motivated?
The "cultural defense," as it is commonly called, is a legal strategy that uses
evidence about a defendant's cultural background to negate or to mitigate criminal
3. See Myrna Oliver, Immigrant Crimes: Cultural Defense-A Legal Tactic, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1988,
at Al, available in WESTLAW, LAT database, 1988 WL 2235300, at *1-*2; see also Alice J. Gallin, The
Cultural Defense: Undermining the Policies Against Domestic Violence, 35 B.C. L. REv. 723, 727 (1994);
Lyman, supra note 2, at 93-94.
4. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 151 (citing People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Super. Ct., Mar. 21,
1989) (unpublished decision)); see also Renteln, supra note 1, at 439 n.2, 480-81, 519 (discussing Chen);
JOSHUA DRESsLER, UNDERsTANDING CRIMNAL LAw § 6.2, at 494-95 (2d ed. 1995) (same).
5. See Richard Lacayo, Whose Peers?, TIME, Sept. 22, 1993, at 60, available in WESTLAW. Magazine
database, at *6.
6. The five friends of Binh Gia Pham were charged with second degree manslaughter, an offense that
carries a maximum of ten years in prison. The judge, however, ruled that Pham would have sacrificed himself
"with or without" his friends and granted them probation. See Lacayo, supra note 5, at 60, WESTLAW,
Magazine database, at *6-*7.
7. See Howard Pankratz, Jury Rejects "Loss of Face" Insanity Plea, DENVER POST, Mar. 10, 1995, at B1,
available in WESTLAW, Allnews database, 1995 WL 6566996, at * 1-*2 (quoting defense attorneys Edward Pluss
and Dave Heckenbach); see also Sue Lindsay, Killer Gets Lifefor Slaying at Food Court, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
June 2, 1995, at A30, available in WESTLAW, Allnews database, 1995 WL 3195616, at "1-'3.
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liability (with a concomitant sentence reduction).8 This Article advocates the
formal adoption of an evidentiary framework which would permit cultural
evidence to be admitted to explain the defendant's state of mind at the time of the
offense. Such a limited use of the cultural "defense" would be used, not to
establish a new substantive criminal defense, but to establish the elements of
traditional criminal defenses.9 Thus, cultural evidence would be used in the same
way that other types of evidence are used to establish the defendant's state of
mind at the time the crime was committed.
Part II briefly discusses the purposes of and the premises underlying criminal
law and the general types of criminal defenses. Part m presents and analyzes the
arguments for and against recognizing a substantive or a "limited use" cultural
"defense." Part III also explains this Article's advocation of the limited use
approach. Part IV examines recent applications of cultural evidence to
demonstrate its current misuse. Part V introduces the concept of "cultural
preemption" and presents an evidentiary framework for evaluating cultural
evidence that conforms with the objectives of the United States criminal justice
system. Part VI discusses possible objections to the evidentiary framework
outlined in Part V.
II. CRIMINAL LAW'S GOALS, PREMISES, AND DEFENSES
A. Criminal Law's Purposes and Premises
Generally, criminal law has five purposes or goals. First, criminal law is
intended to prevent harm to society and its individual members. 0 Second,
criminal law is aimed at deterring future criminal acts." Third, criminal law is
intended to rehabilitate criminals through punishment, and thus make them fit to
8. See generally Cultural Defense, supra note 1, at 1293, 1294-95; see also Renteln, supra note 1, at 439
("A cultural defense is a defense asserted by immigrants, refugees, and indigenous people based on their customs
or customary law."); Andrew M. Kanter, The Yenaldlooshi in Court and the Killing of a Witch: The Case for
an Indian Cultural Defense, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. LJ. 411, 413 (1995) ("At its core, the cultural defense is an
argument for tolerance of foreign cultures due to a lack of moral basis for punishment.").
9. Diminished capacity, insanity, battered woman's syndrome, and Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome are all examples of evidence of a defendant's background or internal worldview which currently can
be used to establish an elemem of a traditional criminal defense (e.g., self-defense). See Rentein, supra note 1,
at 465, 471.
Evidence of a defendant's state of mind can also be used to create a criminal defense, based on that
particular type of state of mind. See DRESSLEt, supra note 4, §§ 18.06, 25.02, 25.07, 25.08, 26, at 220-21, 314,
327-33, 335-45 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing the debate surrounding the creation of a new special battered woman's
defense; explaining the use of insanity as a substantive affimative defense and the debate around such a defense;
and explaining the use of diminished capacity to establish a substantive negative defense or a substantive
affirmative defense).
10. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. SCOT, JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 1.2, at 10 (2d ed. 1986) (Criminal
law is intended to "prevent injury to the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the public.").
11. See id § 1.5, at 23-25. Deterrence is of two types: specific and general. See id Under the theory of
specific deterrence, punishment prevents the criminal from committing similar crimes in the future. See id § 1.5.
at 23. Under the theory of general deterrence, punishment of a criminal deters others from committing similar
crimes out of fear of suffering the same punishment. See id § 1.5, at 24-25.
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live in society again." Fourth, the punishment dealt by criminal law is intended
as retribution-giving criminals what they deserve. 13 Finally, criminal law
educates society as to what constitutes "good" and "bad" conduct.'
4
There are several basic premises upon which criminal law rests. 5 First, based
upon the notion of fairness, is the premise that there must be advance warning to
the public as to what conduct is criminal and how such conduct will be
punished.' 6 This premise is sometimes expressed by the maxim "nullem crimen
sine lege, nulla poena sine lege" (no crime or punishment without law). 7 A
second premise is that there cannot be criminal liability for bad thoughts alone.'"
In other words, there must be an actus reus or an overt, physical act (or omission
where there is a duty to act).' A third premise is that the defendant must
possess the requisite mens rea, or guilty mind. ° A fourth premise is that the
actus reus and the mens rea must concur.2 Underlying these four premises is
the belief that justice can be attained through a uniform, neutral, and principled
application of the law.22
Mens rea is the term used to describe the mental element in blameworthy or
culpable conduct which leads to criminal liability.' The term covers a variety
of mental states, all involving some blameworthy element. 2 Mens rea means
something more than immorality or impure motive; it means a particular kind of
intent to commit a crime.' The precise definition of mens rea has been referred
12. See id § 1.5, at 24.
13. See Renteln, supra note 1, at 441-42 (arguing that retribution is "the fundamental justification for
punishment," so long as the retribution is proportional). However, according to one criminal law treatise, the
retribution theory is currently unpopular with criminal law theorists. See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 10, § 1.5,
at 25-26.
14. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 10, § 1.5, at 25. Restraint is an additional theory of criminal
punishment. See id. § 1.5, at 23-26. Restraint protects the public from future dangerous acts of a convicted
individual "by isolating this person from society." Id. § 1.5, at 23. However, like retribution, the restraint theory
no longer has a strong academic following. See id § 1.5, at 23-24.
15. See id § 1.2, at 8.
16. See id
17. See id.
18. See id § 1.3, at 12-15.
19. See id § 1.2, at 8.
20. See id There is a trend in modem criminal law to relax the requirement that there cannot be a crime
without a bad state of mind. See id § 1.3, at 12-15.
21. See id § 1.2, at 8. LaFave and Scott list two additional premises, the requirement of causation and the
requirement of harm, which are not relevant to our discussion. See id
22. Many legal scholars dispute the ability of the law and legal discourse to be neutral and principled and
question the desirability of such objectivity, even assuming its existence. See generally MARK KELMAN, A
GUIDE TO CRTcAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984);
Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195 (1987);
Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE PoLTICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 18 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
23. See LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 10, § 3.4, at 214.
24. See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 10, § 3.4, at 213. See generally Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall,
Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681,
685-91 (1983).
25. See Robinson & Grail. supra note 24, at 686; see also Renteln. supra note 1. at 443; DRESSIER. supra
note 4, § 10.04, at 106-07.
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to as a "baffling problem," which eludes "any common principle of universal
application running alike through all the cases. 27 This is because "mens rea
does not mean a single precise state of mind which must be proved as a
prerequisite for all criminality";2 rather, a different state of mind may be
required for each crime. The United States Supreme Court has stated that
courts of various jurisdictions, and for the purposes of different offenses, have
devised working formulae, if not scientific ones, for the instruction of juries
around such terms as "felonious intent," "criminal intent," "malice
aforethought," "guilty knowledge," "fraudulent intent," . wilfulness,"
"scienter," to denote guilty knowledge, or "mens rea," to signify an evil
purpose or mental culpability. By use or combination of these various tokens,
they have sought to protect those who were not blameworthy in mind from
conviction of infamous common-law crimes. 9
The Model Penal Code further delineates among mental states by applying
different culpability requirements to different material elements of the same
crime.
In some states, such as California, conviction for certain crimes requires that
the defendant possess more than the general blameworthy state required of all
crimes. These crimes require that the defendant possess the specific intent to do
some particular prohibited act.31 Typically, assault, attempt, conspiracy, assault
with intent to commit a felony, larceny, and robbery are specific intent crimes. 2
General intent and specific intent are "notoriously difficult terms to define and
apply.933 Often, the same crime requires both specific and general intent. In
addition, many crimes require mental states that are not easily categorizable as
either "general" or "specific" intent. For example, the California Penal Code
26. Frances Bowes Sayre, The Present Signification ofMens Rea in the Criminal Law, in HARVARD LEGAL
ESSAYS 399, 411 (1934); see DREssLER, supra note 4, § 10.02, at 102.
27. Sayre, supra note 26, at 404.
28. Id at 402.
29. Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).
30. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(1), (2) (1985); see also DRESSLER, supra note 4, § 10.07, at 120-23.
For a discussion of the ambiguities in the MODEL PENAL CODE's culpability terms, see Robinson & Grail, supra
note 24, at 705-19.
31. For example, the California Supreme Court distinguished general intent crimes from specific intent
crimes as follows:
When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without
reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, we ask whether the
defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal
intent. When the definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act or achieve some
additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent.
People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 456 (Cal. 1969) (in bank); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(a) (West Cum. Supp.
1988).
Many states make this distinction between specific and general intent crimes. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-1-501(5) (West Cum. Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:10 (West 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-3-5 (RepI. Pamp. 1994). However, the MODEL PENAL CODE discards the distinction between "general" and
"specific" intent crimes. See DREssLER, supra note 4, § 10.07, at 120.
32. See B.E. WrrKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIEGRNo A CRuImNAL LAw § 101, at 121-22 (2d ed. 1988).
See generally LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 10, §§ 3.5(a), (e), at 216-17, 224.
33. People v. Whitfield, 868 P.2d 272. 277-78 (Cal. 1994) (quoting Hood, 462 P.2d at 377).
Winter 1997]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
describes "malice" as "a wish to vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent
to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law."'
Although implied malice is not a specific intent crime, evidence of intoxication
may negate the requirement that the defendant acted with knowledge of the
danger to, and in conscious disregard of, human life.35 The word "knowingly"
as an element of the crime charged requires only a knowledge of the facts without
requiring knowledge of the unlawfulness of the act or omission. 6 But where the
crime is a codified common-law offense that normally requires only general
intent, the addition of the word "knowingly" indicates a legislative intent to
require specific intent.37
To make matters more complicated, the same type of evidence may be excluded
in one criminal trial and yet permitted in another. For example, evidence about
Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome31 may be admitted in some
cases, but excluded in other cases depending upon the facts of the case. 39 The
admissibility of evidence varies from case to case, in large part, due to the fact-
specific inquiry necessary in criminal cases. Not surprisingly, the confusion
concerning the use of cultural evidence, further discussed below in Part IV, stems
from the difficulty generally inherent in determining criminal intent and the
relevance of certain types of evidence.
B. Traditional Substantive Criminal Defenses
1. Negative Defenses
Substantive criminal defenses can be divided into two categories: negative (e.g.,
failure of proof) defenses and affirmative (e.g., justification or excuse) defenses.'
A negative defense is one in which the defendant asserts that the prosecution has not
34. CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(4) (West 1988).
35. See Whitfield, 868 P.2d at 276; see also CAL. JURY INSTR. CRIM. 8.11 (West 1988).
36. See WrrKIN & EPSTEIN, supra note 32, § 104, at 124. See generally LAFAVE & SCoT, supra note 10,
§§ 3.5(a), (b), at 215-20.
37. See id.; see also Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254 (1952).
38. "Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome is a psychological phenomenon prevalent amongst
victims of child sexual abuse," State v. Foret, 628 So.2d 1116, 1124 (La. 1993), and is "a listing of factors...
'most characteristic of child sexual abuse."' Id (quoting Dr. Roland C. Summit, Abuse of the Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, J. CHLD SEXUAL ABUSE 153. 154 (1992)).
39. See, e.g., Foret, 628 So.2d 1116; Yount v. State, 872 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc);
People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391 (Mich. 1989).
40. Two additional types of substantive criminal defenses, which will not be discussed in this Article, are
offense modification and nonexculpatory defenses. See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic
Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 203 (1982); see also DRESSLER, supra note 4, § 16.03, at 182-84. An offense
modification defense exists when "the actor has apparently satisfied all elements of the offense charged, [but]
has not caused the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense." Robinson, supra,
at 209. Examples of offense modification defenses are renunciation, impossibility, and consent. See id. at 242.
A nonexculpatory defense admits that the defendant is guilty of the offense he or she is charged with committing
(legally culpable), and admits that the defendant deserves to be punished (morally culpable), but argues that for
public policy reasons the defendant should not be punished. See id at 229-30. Examples of nonexculpatory
defenses are statutes of limitation, double jeopardy, immunity, and entrapment. See id. at 243; see also Renteln,
supra note 1, at 446 n.22.
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established its case against the defendant and/or that the defendant did not commit
the offense he or she has been charged with committing.4' The negative defense
"involves showing that the prosecution has not met its burden of proof."'42 The
negative defense is more specifically known as a failure of proof defense. For a
person to be convicted of a crime, every element of that crime must be established
beyond a reasonable doubt.43 A failure of proof defense asserts that the prosecution
has failed to establish all the elements of the alleged crime and, thus, has failed to
establish the primafacie case.'
Narrowly conceived, a failure of proof-or negative--defense is a complete
defense. It establishes that the defendant's conduct did not fall under the definition
of the alleged offense.43 A failure of proof defense may not exculpate the
defendant. Such a defense, however, may mitigate the punishment received. Thus,
a successful failure of proof defense may negate the defendant's guilt for the crime
charged (e.g., first degree murder), but the defendant may still be found guilty of a
lesser offense (e.g., voluntary manslaughter) and punished to a lesser extent. 46
2. Affirmative Defenses
Generally, with affirmative defenses, the defendant argues that he or she should
not be found guilty or punished (or punishment should be mitigated), even though
the elements of the offense have been established, because the defendant is less
culpable or blameworthy for specified reasons.47 The defendant has the burden of
proof in demonstrating an affirmative defense.48 Affirmative defenses can be
complete or partial defenses.4
9
Affirmative defenses can be divided into two broad categories: justification
and excuse."o Justification defenses recognize that the harm caused is a legally
41. Dressier argues that the failure of proof defense is not a "true" defense. See DRESSLER, supra note 4,
§ 16.03, at 182.
42. Renteln, supra note 1, at 447.
43. See Robinson, supra note 40, at 204; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(1) (1985).
44. See Robinson, supra note 40, at 204-05; see also Renteln, supra note 1, at 447. Although the failure
of proof defense is a "negative defense" because the defendant must argue that the prosecution has failed to
prove its prima facie case, "[tihe defendant ... may have to act affirmatively to present evidence on the issue
of a given element of the offense" to prove that the prosecution has failed to carry its burden. Robinson, supra
note 40, at 204; see Renteln, supra note 1, at 447 & n.25.
[In] theory a cultural defense could be either an affnimative or negative defense, though in
practice the cultural defense has most often functioned as an affirmative defense. The reason
for this is probably that the legal system, and society as well, are unfamiliar with the folkways
of ethnic minority groups.
Renteln, supra note 1, at 447 n.25. As a result, the defense "require[s] the use of expert witnesses to explain
the cultural practice in order to demonstrate its relevance and importance to the case." Id
45. See Robinson, supra note 40, at 206, 213; see also Renteln, supra note 1, at 446-47, 465-66.
46. See Robinson, supra note 40, at 206; see also Renteln, supra note 1, at 466 & n.l10, 488-89.
47. See Robinson, supra note 40, at 220, 221, 229; see also Rentein, supra note 1, at 447.
48. See Rentein, supra note 1, at 447. "[Flor example, [when] the insanity defense is raised as an
affirmative defense in a case, it is the defense attorney who must produce evidence, usually through expert
witnesses, to attest to the existence of the alleged mental condition and thereby establish the appropriateness of
the defense." Id
49. See generally Renteln, supra note 1, at 446.
50. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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recognizable one, but "[u]nder the special justifying circumstances... that harm
is outweighed by the need to avoid an even greater harm or to further a greater
societal interest."51 Furthermore, the defendant's conduct, if justifiable, is
"correct behavior" which is tolerated or encouraged by society. Justification
defenses are exculpatory, providing complete defenses.53
Self-defense is an example of a justification defense.M In self-defense, the
defendant has caused a legally recognizable harm (death of another) and has
satisfied the basic elements of a murder-type offense (intent to kill another
accompanied by conduct that does kill). The defendant's action, however, to
preserve his or her own life when threatened by the deceased is also conduct that
society "encourage[s] or at least tolerate[s] ' '55 and thus makes the actor legally
blameless for the death his or her conduct has caused.56
Excuse defenses are similar to justification defenses in that the elements of the
offense charged and the defendant's intent are not in question. Excuse defenses
are different from justification defenses in that a greater harm was not averted nor
a greater societal interest promoted by the defendant's harmful conduct. The
defendant's conduct is excused, however, either completely or partially, because
the defendant was not legally responsible for his or her action-his or her conduct
was not a product of his or her meaningful free will.5 Examples of excuse
defenses are insanity, intoxication, involuntary actions, and provocationl"heat of
passion.""
III. CULTURAL EVIDENCE AND THE CULTURAL DEFENSE
Generally, three differing viewpoints surround the cultural defense issue.
Proponents of a substantive cultural defense would exculpate a criminal defendant
if his or her actions would be legal or excusable in his or her native country. 9
Opponents of a cultural defense would prohibit the use of cultural evidence in
51. Robinson, supra note 40, at 213. For a discussion of other theories underlying the justification defense,
see DRESSLER, supra note 4, § 17.02, at 186-89.
52. See Robinson, supra note 40, at 214, 229.
53. See id at 220, 229.
54. See id. at 215, 242. For a detailed examination of self-defense, see DRESSLER, supra note 4, § 18, at
199-229.
55. Id at 229.
56. See id at 214, 229.
57. See id at 229. "An excuse represents a legal conclusion that the conduct is wrong, undesirable, but that
criminal liability is inappropriate because some characteristic of the actor vitiates society's desire to punish him."
Id. Generally, the other purposes of criminal law (e.g., deterrence and education) are not promoted, either. See
generally Renteln, supra note 1, at 492-95. For a discussion of other theories underlying the excuse defense, see
DRESSLER, supra note 4, § 17.03, at 189-93.
Robinson differentiates excuse defenses from justification defenses as follows: "Excuses do not destroy
blame, as do [failure of proof, offense modification, and justification defenses]; rather, they shift [the blame]
from the actor to the excusing conditions. The focus in excuses is on the actor[; while the focus in justifications
is on the act]. Acts are justified; actors are excused." Robinson, supra note 40, at 229.
58. See Robinson, supra note 40, at 221, 222.
59. See discussion infra Part Ill.A. The term "country" in this Article is broadly defined to include tribes,
communities, regions, territories, and nations.
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criminal cases, arguing that such evidence is irrelevant.' "Limited use" cultural
"defense" advocates would permit cultural evidence to be used, not as a negative or
an affirmative defense per se, but to prove the mens rea element of traditional
affirmative or negative defenses and to prove mitigating circumstances at
sentencing."
A. Substantive/Affirmative Cultural Defense Approach
Proponents of a substantive cultural defense argue for the adoption of a new
formal affirmative defense within the criminal law.62 A substantive criminal
defense would excuse the defendant's otherwise criminal behavior because cultural
attributes of the defendant induced the defendant to act as he or she did-the
defendant's "actions are part of a legitimate tradition, the defendant relied on that
tradition, and the tradition trumps the [criminal law in question]."'63 Although most
excuse defenses are exculpatory (complete defenses), they also can act as partial
defenses.6 Thus, a substantive cultural defense could be adopted as either a
complete defense' or as only a partial excuse defense.'
Proponents of a substantive cultural defense argue that recognition of this defense
is justified for two reasons." First, a cultural defense would tailor the punishment
to fit the defendant's culpability, consistent with the liberal legal notion of
individualized justice." Under this theory of punishment, the defendant is not
blameworthy, or not as blameworthy, as one who commits the same act knowing
that it is wrong.' Thus, a cultural defense would be used the way insanity or
provocation/"heat of passion" defenses are used-to excuse, or partially excuse,
criminal behavior7' because it is unfair to (completely or partially) blame and
punish the actor.7 '
60. See discussion infra Part III.B.
61. See discussion infra Part Il.C.
62. See, e.g., Cultural Defense, supra note 1, at 1296.
63. Kanter, supra note 8, at 449.
64. See supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also DRESSLER, supra note 4, §§ 18.06, 26.03, at 221,
340-45 (discussing the argument that the battered woman's syndrome should be established as a full or partial
excuse defense; explaining the "partial responsibility" approach to the diminished capacity defense).
65. See Cultural Defense, supra note 1, at 1296.
66. See Renteln, supra note 1, at 490.
67. See, e.g., Cultural Defense, supra note 1, at 1296.
68. See Renteln, supra note 1, at 441, 500-01; see also Cultural Defense, supra note 1, at 1298-99.
69. Professor Kadish states:
To blame a person is to express a moral criticism, and if the person's action does not
deserve criticism, blaming him is a kind of falsehood and is, to the extent the person is
injured by being blamed, unjust to him. It is this feature of our everyday moral practices that
lies behind the law's excuses.
Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 264 (1987).
70. See generally LAFAVE & ScOTr, supra note 10, § 4.1, at 304-08.
71. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw, §10.1, at 759 (1978); see also Robinson, supra
note 40, at 199; Kadish, supra note 69, at 257.
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Second, recognizing a substantive cultural defense would further the United
States' commitment to cultural pluralism.72 Requiring newcomers (or indigenous
people73) to conform to the dominant population's values is anomalous in a
country whose very existence is premised upon cultural and religious freedom.74
Recognizing a cultural defense would encourage the preservation of traditional
cultures which would add to the richness of United States society.
7
B. No Cultural Defense Approach
Opponents of a cultural defense use the same twin themes of individualized
justice and cultural pluralism to argue against permitting a substantive cultural
defense.76 Opponents, applying criminal law's premise that justice requires
uniform application of the law, claim that an individualized system of justice
requires all individuals to obey society's rules and ensures all individuals equal
treatment and equal protection under the law.'
Opponents further argue that a substantive cultural defense would be unfair
because it would treat immigrants and other culturally motivated defendants
preferentially,7 while failing to protect victims of culturally motivated crimes.
Thus, a substantive cultural defense would frustrate the protection goal of criminal
law. Excusing criminal behavior on the basis of the accused's cultural background
would violate the objective of criminal law to prevent injury to society at large.79
Each member of society is entitled to protection from every other member for
unlawful acts. For the legal system to function properly, each individual has the
72. See Cultural Defense, supra note 1, at 1300-02; see also Kanter, supra note 8, at 422; Renteln, supra
note 1, at 505. Professor Renteln has also argued that recognizing the cultural defense is "necessary and
important" and that a pluralistic society like the United States is "only pretending to accept cultural diversity
if it rejects it when it really matters." Don J. DeBenedictis, Judges Debate Cultural Defense, 78 A.B.A. J., Dec.
1992, at 28, 28 (quoting Professor Alison D. Renteln). Renteln added that "[r]equiring or expecting assimilation
of minorities ... is 'potentially coercive'... [and that aiccommodation of other worldviews would be better."
JL (quoting Professor Alison D. Rentein).
73. See Kanter, supra note 8, at 413.
74. Many legal commentators argue that a failure to recognize and accommodate cultural differences often
results in an identity crisis on the part of the nonmajoritarian group. See generally Rachel F. Moran,
Commentary: The Implications of Being a Society of One. 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 503, 507 (1986); Gerald Torres,
Local Knowledge, Local Color: Critical Legal Studies and the Law of Race Relations, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1043, 1068 (1988).
For a discussion of the harm caused to Chicano identities as a result of conflict with Eurocentric civil culture,
see Carlos Villarreal, Culture in Lawmaking: A Chicano Perspective, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1193 (1991).
75. See GumO CALABRasL IDEAS, BEUEI. AfrrfruDEs AND THE LAw 28-31 (1985) (arguing that
America's "melting pot" tradition allows attainment of equality only through cultural subjugation); see also
Cultural Defense, supra note 1, at 1302 & n.46 (citing CALABRESI, supra).
76. See, e.g., Chiu, supra note 2, at 1095-1120.
77. One commentator argues that a cultural defense makes a "mockery" of individualized justice because
"for far too many individuals the result [of using a cultural defense] does not provide justice." Goldstein, supra
note 1, at 163.
78. See Lyman, supra note 2, at 116. But see LAuRENcE H. TRmE, AMIaCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16-
1. at 992-93 (1978) (discussing the concept that equality sometimes requires that people in dissimilar situations
be treated dissimilarly).
79. See Renten, supra note 1, at 503.
[Vol. 27
CULTURAL DEFENSE
responsibility to know and obey the law.' Opponents also argue that because our
society is so diverse, one rule of law is imperative to prevent anarchy and
disorder.8 In other words, it is precisely because we have a culturally pluralistic
society that we must reject a substantive cultural defense.'
In addition, opponents argue that a substantive cultural defense will undermine
criminal law's goals of deterrence and education. Under the deterrence theory,
punishing the criminal for the crime that he or she committed deters others from
committing similar crimes in the future." Opponents explain that penalizing
culturally motivated defendants will force them to alter traditions that conflict with
United States laws and thereby accelerate the assimilation process.8 Furthermore,
because many cultures condone the subordination of women, many commentators
argue that a substantive cultural defense will undermine the progress women have
made in this country by failing to educate people that gender oppression should not
be tolerated. 5
80. See Julia P. Sams, Comment, The Availability of a "Cultural Defense" as an Excuse for Criminal
Behavior, 16 GEoRGIA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 335 (1986).
81. Deputy District Attorney Lauren L. Weis, the prosecutor in the California People v. Kimura case,
reasoned that "[y]ou're treading on such shaky ground when you decide something based on a cultural thing
because our society is made up of so many different cultures. It is very hard to draw the line somewhere, but
they are living in our country and people have to abide by our laws or else you have anarchy." Spencer
Sherman, Legal Clash of Cultures, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 5, 1985, available in LEXISNEXIS, Genfed Library,
NTLAWJ File (quoting Deputy District Attorney Lauren L. Weis).
82. This view is reflected in the statement expressed by Elizabeth Holtzman, the district attorney in the New
York People v. Chen case, who stated that "[t]here should be one standard of justice, not one that depends on the
cultural background of the defendant." Marianne Yen, Refusal to Jail Immigrant Who Killed Wife Stirs Outrage,
WASH. PosT, Apr. 10,1989, at A3, available in WESTLAW, Allnews database, 1989 WL 2062004, at *5 (quoting
Brooklyn District Attorney Elizabeth Holtzman); see also, Sams, supra note 80, at 335. Sams argues that if the
cultural defense is accepted by American courts, the following four problems will arise: (1) difficulties in defining
which groups of defendants may assert the defense; (2) maintaining the deterrent effect of the criminal law on these
groups; (3) maintaining fairness to the majority of Americans who cannot use the defense; and (4) upholding the
principle of legality. See id at 345. An additional problem is maintaining fairness to the would-be victims of
culturally motivated defendants. See Renteln, supra note 1, at 503; see also Goldstein, supra note 1, at 163.
83. See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 10, § 1.5, at 24-25.
84. See Malek-Mithra Sheybani, Comment, Cultural Defense: One Person's Culture Is Another's Crime,
9 Loy. L.A. INT'L & Coep. LJ. 751, 779 (1987); Lyman, supra note 2, at 87; Sams, supra note 80, at 335. But
see Renteln, supra note 1, at 494 (arguing that in many cases general deterrence will not be affected by a
cultural defense).
85. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 144. See generally Gallin, supra note 3; Cathy Young, Equal
Cultures---or Equality?: There's a Choice to Make Between Feminism and Multiculturalism, WASH. POST, Mar.
29, 1992, at C5, available in WESTLAW, Allnews database, 1992 WL 2196303; Jenny Rivera, Domestic
Violence Against Latinas By Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials,
14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231 (1994). Rivera explains that
even if violent actions against women are inherent to a particular culture in certain situations,
such conduct or norms are often based on patriarchal structures. Legitimizing violent actions
as cultural norms only reinforces the patriarchy, and would only lead to further abuse of
women. The actions must also be rejected because they run counter to a legal system
allegedly founded on the equality of all individuals.
Rivera, supra, at 251.
Judge Margaret Taylor of New York has said: "I'm to the point [that] I'm pretty fed up with excusing men's
violence .... I no longer think it should be excused on a cultural basis." DeBenedictis, supra note 72, at 28
(quoting New York Judge Margaret Taylor).
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Recent cases involving a cultural defense underscore its potential impact upon the
criminal law's deterrence and education goals. In Los Angeles, for example, the
disallowance of a cultural defense to domestic abuse charges in the prosecution of
several Vietnamese men for battery informed other members of the Vietnamese
community that this practice, even if permissible in Vietnam, would not be tolerated
in the United States." In stark contrast, after the People v. Chen7 decision, in
which cultural evidence was allowed to defend and excuse the defendant's killing
of his adulterous wife, many battered women in the Asian community expressed fear
that the legal system would fail to protect them from their husbands.8" As a result,
Asian women were reluctant to report battering incidents. 9 Barbara Chang, co-
director of the New York Asian Women's Center, stated that although it has always
been difficult to convince Asian immigrant women to endure the confusing and
frustrating process involved with obtaining protective court orders, after Chen, many
Asian women believe the effort is no longer worth it."
Opponents of a substantive cultural defense also assert that the defense is
inherently problematic. First, permitting a cultural defense to excuse the defendant's
behavior would, in some cases, characterize the defendant's actions as a
manifestation of a mental defect. Excuse defenses are generally based on the theory
that the defendant is not blameworthy, or as blameworthy, because the defendant
had "a disability causing an excusing condition. The disability is the abnormal
condition of the actor at the time of the offense. We say, for example, that the actor
is suffering from insanity, intoxication, subnormality, or immaturity." 91 Thus, a
substantive cultural defense would attach a negative value to the cultural practice
rather than a positive or "neutral" value. The cultural practice would be
characterized as "strange" and the defendant's adherence to it labeled a "disability,"
One commentator states that because immigrants may be accustomed to laws that allow men to kill their
wives, there is a real risk that widespread acceptance of a cultural defense would have disastrous consequences
for immigrant women. See Melissa Spatz, A "Lesser" Crime: A Comparative Study of Legal Defenses for Men
Who Kill Their Wives, 24 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 597, 626-27 (1991).
86. Michael R. Yamaki, a criminal defense lawyer, stated: "I had a whole stream of Vietnamese men
accused of wife beating .... They would look incredulously at the police and say, 'This is my wife,' like a wife
was property almost. They would look at me and say, 'What is the problem here? How can they put me in jail
for this?' Oliver, supra note 3, at A1, 1988 WL 2235300, at *16 (quoting Michael R. Yamaki). Yamaki added
that "[a]s they start going to court and start getting carted off to jail for things like wife beating, it gets the word
out .... Some of these guys get the brunt of being educated for the benefit of the whole community." hL at
Al, 1988 WL 2235300, at *17 (quoting Michael R. Yamaki).
87. No. 87-7774 (N.Y. super. CL, Mar. 21, 1989) (unpublished decision) (cited in Goldstein, supra note
1, at 151); see discussion infra Part W.B.
88. See Goldstein. supra note 1, at 162.
89. See Alexis Jetter, Fear is Legacy of Wife Killing in Chinatown. NEWSDAY, Nov. 26, 1989, at 4,
available in WESTLAW, Allnews database, 1989 WL 3472702. at *4.
A battered Chinese woman at the New York Asian Women's Center confessed that "[e]ven thinking about
[the Chen] case makes me afraid .... My husband has told me: 'If this is the kind of sentence you get for
killing your wife, I could do anything to you. I have the money for a good attorney."' I. at 4, 1989 WL
3472702, at *1-*2. Another battered Chinese woman said: "You can't help but think there is nowhere to go
for help," reasoning that if a man only gets five years' probation for killing his wife, "what if you only get hit
or beaten? If everyone thinks like this judge, you can't get any protection." Id. at 4. 1989 WL 3472702, at *4.
90. See id.
91. Robinson, supra note 40, at 221.
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thereby undermining the goal of cultural pluralism and forcing the homogenization
of United States society.
Opponents further argue that a cultural defense is a double-edged sword that can
be used to promote racism and perpetuate stereotypes. 2 Under this theory, a
prosecutor could introduce evidence about a defendant's cultural background to
prove that the defendant was more likely to have committed a crime because of his
or her cultural background.93 This misuse of cultural evidence dangerously panders
to the racist beliefs that jurors may hold. The effects are even more detrimental
when false or anachronistic stereotypes are promoted.'
Finally, opponents argue that the cultural defense should not be permitted because
the grave potential for overbroad application makes it impractical. 95 A cultural
defense may be inappropriately used for two reasons. First, any nondominant ethnic,
92. Professor Denno has cautioned against the use of gender differences for the same reason. See Deborah
W. Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 80, 85-86 (1994).
"[G]ender-stereotyping can result in personal stigmatization, or harm men or women as a group. If poorly used,
it can ease conviction .... [Glender differences... should not justify either mitigations in punishment or the
underlying rationales for criminal law defenses, unless the defenses are appropriately factually-based." l at 85-
86 (footnotes omitted).
One commentator has argued that the "real danger" with the cultural defense debate lies in the "reproduction
and perpetuation of stereotypes about Asian Americans ...." Chiu, supra note 2, at 1103; see Polman, supra
note 2, at Al, 1989 WL 2933827, at *4 ("You don't want to import those cultural values [that harm women]
into our judicial system .... We don't want women victimized by backward customs." (quoting Margaret Fung,
Director of the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund)).
93. For example, in State v. Boulabeiz, 634 N.E.2d 700 (Ohio 1994), the defendant was accused of hitting
two women with his automobile because the women were fighting in the street. See id. The prosecutor
questioned a defense witness about the culture and beliefs of people living in Morocco, the defendant's native
country; the number of brothers and sisters in the defendant's family; whether the defendant's sisters travelled;
whether women living in Morocco had the right to vote or own property; and the consequences a Moroccan
woman might face if she fought in the street. See id. at 702. In his closing argument, the prosecutor stated:
"Why would anybody do this [hit two women with his car]? And that was the only reason for asking questions
about the cultural mind-set that exists in another part of the world in terms of attitude [sic] towards women, and
I think that could be part of this. I don't know." l (quoting the prosecutor). The defendant was convicted of
felonious assault. See id. at 701. Unfortunately, on appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor's
questions and his remarks during closing argument concerning Moroccan culture did not prejudice the defendant
See id at 703.
94. For example, in People v. Criscione, 177 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1981), the defendant was accused of murdering
his girlfriend. See idL On cross-examination of the defendant's brother, the prosecutor asked: "[A previous
witness] described your family as a typical Italian family. Does that mean the father is an ogre and the mother
is a dominant overbearing personT' Id at 904 (quoting the prosecutor). The prosecutor then asked a series of
questions intended to establish that the defendant's violent attitude and conduct toward the victim, and women
in general, were not symptomatic of mental diseases, but a "normal response" of a man raised in a traditional
Italian culture. See id The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. See idi at 899. On appeal, the
California Court of Appeals held that what was most invidious about the prosecutor's tactics was not the appeal
to ethnic prejudice, but the "palpably false nature of the information argued, which can only have been intended
to divert the jury from a rational consideration of the grave question of appellant's sanity." Id at 906. The
California Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the jury's finding that the defendant was sane at the time
of the killing. See id. at 909.
95. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 158. For example, Professor Herman states that "[t]he problem with
recognizing a cultural defense as an excuse is that the slope of determinism is indeed a slippery one .... To
understand all is to forgive all. But if we forgive all, we have no criminal law left." Susan N. Herman, New York
Forum About Crime: Should Culture Be a Defense?, NEWSDAY, Apr. 20, 1989, at 80, available in WESTLAW,
Alnews database, 1989 WL 3373080, at *5.
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racial, or cultural group member could argue that he or she should be permitted to
use a cultural defense." Underlying this "slippery slope" argument is the belief that
the legal system is incapable of drawing lines between categories of individuals who
should or should not be permitted to use the cultural defense 9 -should it be
limited to immigrants or available to all non-dominant cultural groups?" If limited
96. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 159-60. Cultural defenses may be attempted by "any minority who has
suffered an inhibiting 'experience' in America. For example, defendants may present evidence on the 'African
American experience.' or the 'Japanese American experience,' or the 'Hispanic experience' in America." Id
As a result, Goldstein argues that a "formalized cultural defense encompasses too broad a defendant group to
have any practical application." Id.
Attempts have been made to use a "cultural defense" in cases involving American-born defendants. For
example, in People v. Rhines, 182 Cal. Rptr. 478 (CL App. 1982), in response to a rape charge, the black
defendant offered cultural evidence of the "cultural difference[s]" in the social practices of blacks and whites
as (1) a substantive cultural defense and (2) as cultural evidence to prove the element of voluntary consent of
the black victim for a substantive failure of proof defense. See id at 480, 483. The Rhines court, however,
rejected the defendant's proffered expert testimony on the grounds that such testimony was irrelevant, sexist,
and racist. See id at 483-84. For a critique of the proffered "cultural defense" in People v. Rhines, see Kimberl6
Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It Anyway? Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations of Anita Hill, in RACE-ING
JUS7iCE, EN-GENDEUNG POWER 402, 422-24 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992).
Native American defendants have asserted a cultural defense in at least two cases. In State v. Butler, No.
C-85-05-32135 (Or. Cir. Ct, Sept. 1985) (unpublished decision), two Native Americans killed a systematic,
white gravedigger. The defendants argued that their action was comparable to self-defense, see Renteln, supra
note 1, at 453, and that "desecration of [their tribe's] burial grounds by the victim constituted provocation into
a culturally recognized act of war," Kanter, supra note 8, at 437 n.134. Although the judge did not allow the
case to focus on cultural conflicts, he did allow testimony on the tribe's "religious beliefs concerning sacred
burial grounds and the significance of their desecration." Renteln, supra note 1, at 453; see Kanter, supra note
8, at 435 n.122. In People v. Croy, 710 P.2d 392 (Cal. 1985), the defendant was accused of murdering a police
officer after fleeing a liquor store and being chased by twenty-seven police officers. The defendant lived in an
area of California "where there had been longstanding conflict between the Anglo and Native American
populations." Renteln. supra note 1. at 454. At trial, the defense attorney "presented a cultural defense in the
context of self-defense," arguing that the defendant feared Anglos and white authorities because of discrimination
the defendant had suffered and because of the historical persecution of Native Americans by Anglos and the
United States government. See Rentein, supra note 1, at 454-56; see also Kanter, supra note 8, at 435 n.122.
Rentein notes that Croy is not truly a cultural defense case because "the case did not deal with any cultural
conflict as much as it dealt with race relations. Native Americans do not believe that homicide is justifiable; the
conflict was not about divergent perceptions of reality as in other cultural defense cases." Renteln, supra note
1, at 455.
97. Indeed, it has been stated that "[t]here is realistically no way to limit [the use of cultural defenses], nor
would it be fair to do so." Renteln, supra note 1, at 497. However, Renteln does argue that the use of cultural
defenses can be limited by requiring that the custom in question be authentic and by requiring that only customs
that evidence a radically different worldview from dominant cultural customs be permitted to support a cultural
defense. See id; see also supra note 96.
98. For a discussion and advocation of a formal Native American cultural defense, see generally Kanter,
supra note 8.
Rentein argues that the use of a cultural defense should be limited to "bona fide ethnic minority groups" and
should not be permitted to be used by sub-culture group members, such as gang members or the extremely
wealthy. See Renteln, supra note 1, at 497-98. Renteln explains that "the sub-culture defense has more to do
with class differences than cultural differences" and that the worldview of subcultures "is not radically different
from the rest of society." Id at 497. "For example, gang members do not believe in witchcraft, coining, or other
customs integral to a markedly different conceptual system." Id
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to immigrants, should it be limited to newly-arrived inmigrants? How "newly-
arrived" is newly-arrived? Five years? Ten years?"
Second, the cultural defense may be applied in an overbroad fashion because
culture is a difficult concept to identify and define. °° Culture is amorphous. It is
not static over time and it may be defined differently by different members of the
same social group. 1 ' Therefore, the existence and prevalence of any given cultural
practice is prone to varying interpretations.102
C. The "Limited Use" Approach
Advocates of the "limited use" approach would permit cultural evidence to be
used to determine the existence and/or degree of the requisite mens rea for the
crime.1" Advocates would also allow cultural evidence in the sentencing
stage1°" to determine the existence of mitigating factors.1°5 This approach uses
cultural evidence in much the same way that evidence on the battered woman
syndrome is used in cases where battered women kill their batterers. Expert
testimony on the battered woman's syndrome assesses the reasonableness of the
defendant's actions from the point of view of a reasonable battered woman and not
a hypothetical reasonable person. The evidence of past abuse does not justify or
excuse the use of deadly force,"° but aids in determining the defendant's state of
99. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 160 ("Without an enunciated standard, courts will be without direction
and uncertain as to the application of the defense."); see also Chiu. supra note 2, at 1101-02. Chiu argues that
"[dIefining the parameters of a group who could raise the defense would require crafting a rule that would take
into account the innumerable permutations of race, ethnicity, language, education, religion, culture, gender,
length of residence in the United States, and age. Use of these factors to measure behavioral assimilation would
be a difficult and subjective task at besL" Id
One commentator has argued that the cultural defense should be limited to the fist ten years an immigrant
is in this country. See DeBenedictis, supra note 72, at 29 (quoting a statement by Judge Joan Dempsey Klein,
California Court of Appeals).
100. See Chiu, supra note 2, at 1101; Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist
and Multiculturalist Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36,49,52 (1995);
Renteln, supra note 1, at 498.
101. See Rivera, supra note 85, at 251 (Identifying a particular norm or set of norms as culturally inherent
is "problematic, because defining and identifying culture, or specific aspects of culture, is difficult.").
102. The difficulty of pin-pointing a cultural belief because of the nonstatic nature of culture is exemplified
by People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Super. Ct., Mar. 21, 1989) (unpublished decision). In Chen, the expert
witness testified to Chinese beliefs which are no longer held, or as strongly held. See infra notes 193-200 and
accompanying text.
103. See generally Maguigan, supra note 100.
104. See Placido G. Gomez, The Dilemma of Difference: Race as a Sentencing Factor, 24 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REv. 357, 360 (1994) (A judge should consider the defendant's race as a mitigating factor during
sentencing where "cultural uniqueness peculiar to the offender's race exists and is causally related to the
crime.").
Rentein argues that cultural considerations should be allowed at both the trial and sentencing stages, and that
to distinguish between the two stages, or to admit cultural evidence only at sentencing, is misguided and would
be unjust. See Renteln, supra note 1, at 491-92.
105. See generally Chiu, supra note 2.
106. For a discussion of justification and excuse defenses, see supra Part IJ.B.2.
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mind. °" The battered woman's syndrome is asserted, not to prove that the
defendant was a battered woman, but to prove that she reasonably perceived her life
to be in imminent danger when she killed her batterer."t s Similarly, the limited use
cultural "defense" would be incorporated into existing law as evidence of the
accused's state of mind, where the defendant's state of mind is relevant to the
offense, and not to excuse his or her actions.
This Article supports a limited use cultural "defense." While the arguments for
and against a cultural defense are persuasive, neither position is convincing because
both fail to consider criminal law's broad aim: to prevent harm to society."° The
limited use approach, on the other hand, is consistent with criminal law's objectives,
as discussed in Part II.A.
The problem with the limited use approach is not in its conceptualization, but in
its application. Many courts claim to use cultural evidence in determining the
defendant's state of mind when they are actually using cultural evidence to excuse
the defendant's behavior. Even worse, under the guise of this approach, some judges
are reinforcing harmful stereotypes and encouraging oppressive practices against
subordinated groups, such as women. n ° Objections to the cultural defense are
based upon widely-publicized cases in which cultural evidence was misused. Misuse
of the cultural defense should not be used to justify a prohibition of the cultural
defense. Such misuse, however, does emphasize the necessity of providing
guidelines to assist the judiciary in determining whether to admit cultural evidence.
Part V proposes a conceptual framework which permits the limited use of cultural
evidence, yet safeguards against both the perpetuation of racist stereotypes and the
reinforcement of societal forms of oppression. The framework is intended to
minimize judicial misuse of cultural evidence while upholding the goals of the
United States criminal justice system.
107. See, e.g., People v. Humphrey, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 142 (1996) (Evidence on the battered woman's
syndrome is admissible in California to prove the honest belief requirement of self-defense and the
reasonableness of that belief.).
108. See generally Annie E. Thar, Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Battered Wife
Syndrome: An Evidentiary Analysis, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 348 (1982); see also Roberta K. Thyfault, Self Defense:
Battered Woman Syndrome on Trial (1984), in SARA LEE JOHANN & FRANK OSANKA, REPRESENTING ...
BATTERED WOMEN WHO KIL 30 (1989); DRESSLER, supra note 4, § 18.06, at 215-21. For a critical view of
both the battered woman syndrome defense and of the feminist critique of the defense, see generally Anne M.
Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CA. L. REV. 1 (1994).
109. See LAFAVE & Scowt, supra note 10, § 1.2, at 10. Renteln's support of an affumative, partial excuse
cultural defense is based, at least partially, in her belief that "the fundamental justification for punishment is
retribution." See Renteln, supra note 1, at 442. The rationale for Renteln's argument for a partial excuse cultural
defense is that an individual should be punished-but only to the degree he or she deserves--and that the law
must explicitly acknowledge that although a defendant may be legally culpable, he or she may not be (as)
morally culpable because of the cultural motive underlying his or her conduct See id. at 445. However, this
Article's advocation of a limited use approach of cultural evidence is based on the premise that the protection
of society is, or should be, the preeminent justification for punishment, not retribution.
110. See, e.g., People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Super. Ct., Mar. 21, 1989) (unpublished decision) (cited
in Goldstein, supra note 1, at 151).
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IV. MISAPPLICATION OF CULTURAL EVIDENCE
This section discusses how cultural evidence was applied in two highly-publicized
cases, People v. Kimura and People v. Chen. These two cases were selected because
they illustrate how a purported "limited use" of cultural evidence became a
substantive criminal defense.
A. People v. Kimura
In People v. Kimura,"' the defendant attempted to drown herself and her
children in the ocean after learning of her husband's adulterous affair.1 12 Cultural
evidence was implicitly used to demonstrate that the defendant was adhering to the
accepted Japanese tradition of oya-ko shinju, or parent-child suicide.' 13
In California, where Kimura was charged, murder is defined as "the unlawful
killing of a human being. .. with malice aforethought."1' 14 Malice can be express
or implied. It is express "when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully
to take away the life of a fellow creature.""15 It is implied when "no considerable
provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an
abandoned and malignant heart."".6 Voluntary manslaughter under California law
is defined as "the unlawful killing of a human being without malice"' 7 and "upon
a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.""...
The defense presented evidence to the judge and the prosecutor that mother-child
suicide is understood within the Japanese culture, even if it is not promoted."9
The judge received a petition signed by 25,000 members of the Japanese-American
community which stated that in Japan, Kimura would be charged at most with
involuntary manslaughter "resulting in a light, suspended sentence, probation, and
supervised rehabilitation.' ' " In addition, Japanese culture accepts suicide as an
honorable way of dying. 2' Kimura, after learning of her husband's adulterous
affair, chose to die rather than live in shame and humiliation.'" A mother who
111. No. A-091133 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Nov. 21, 1985) (unpublished decision). For a discussion of this
unpublished case, see Goldstein, supra note 1. at 147: Renteln, supra note 1. at 462, 463-64.
112. See Goldstein, supra note 1. at 147.
113. See generally Chin, supra note 2, at 1117.
114. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West Cum. Supp. 1997).
115. Id. § 188 (West 1988).
116. Id.
117. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West Cum. Supp. 1997); see CAL. JURY INSTR. CRIM. 8.40 (West Supp.
1990).
118. CAL PENAL CODE § 192 (West Cum. Supp. 1997).
119. See Sherman, supra note 81; see also Robert W. Stewart, Probation Given to Mother in Drowning of
Her Two Children, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1985, at B7, available in WESTLAW, LAT database, 1985 WL
2013333, at *6; Renteln, supra note 1, at 463 & nn. 91-92.
120. See Sherman, supra note 81 (quoting a petition signed by 4,000 members of the Japanese community
in Los Angeles); see also Renteln, supra note 1, at 463.
121. See Choi, supra note 1, at 83. But see Chiu, supra note 2, at 1117 n.392 ("Although understandable
within Japanese culture, suicide is still shameful because it represents failure." (citing Deborah Woo, The People
v. Fumiko Kimura: But Which People?, 17 INT'L. J. Soc. LAw. 403, 413 (1989))).
122. See id.; see also Paul Feldman, Mother Pleads No Contest in Drowning of2 Children, L.A. TIMES, OcL
19, 1985, at BI, available in WESTLAW, LAT database, 1985 WL 2025039, at *2.
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commits suicide and leaves her child is regarded in Japan as a cruel and terrible
person.1 3 Rather than leave her children to face a life of humiliation and disgrace,
Kimura chose to include them in her suicide.
Kimura initially was charged with two counts of murder and two counts of felony
child endangerment." The prosecution, allowing Kimura's plea of voluntary
manslaughter,"z denied that cultural factors influenced the plea bargain." The
facts of the case, however, belie the prosecution's claim that cultural evidence was
not used to establish that Kimura's mental state at the moment of the crime was not
that "which was required for murder charges."' 7 The prosecution's determination
that Kinura did not have the requisite mens rea for murder is otherwise illogical.
Without an understanding of Kimura' s cultural background there is no evidence that
her actions were the result of "heat of passion." Kimura took a bus from her home
in Tarzana, California to Santa Monica, a trip which took approximately two hours.
She left the stroller at the bus stop, presumedly because she knew she would no
longer need it. Kimura clearly intended to kill her children, as well as herself. Her
actions, taken without the cultural context, indicated deliberation and premeditation,
and thus would have satisfied the requisite mens rea for murder. Therefore, despite
the prosecution's denial of doing so, cultural evidence was used, even though it was
not formally admitted into court.
The cultural evidence was used to establish that Kimura, in adhering to the well-
documented," s traditional Japanese practice of oya-ko shinju, was "temporarily
insane."' 9 The prosecution stated that Kimura "was not a rational person at the
time.., and to punish somebody like this woman by sending her to state prison, I
don't think society would benefit from it."' 3 Although culture was not the sole
basis upon which the plea agreement was reached, it was a significant factor.
Cultural evidence gave both the judge and the prosecutor a better understanding of
Kimura's world and provided a context for her actions."' The spokesperson for
the prosecution stated that "[b]ased on the unusual facts of this case, a significant
quantity of psychiatric evidence indicates that Kimura' s state of mind at the time of
the crime was less than that required for a murder conviction.' 32 These "unusual
facts" would not have been established if cultural evidence had not been implicitly
123. See Kawanishi, supra note 1, at 40; Choi, supra note 1, at 82.
124. See Alison Matsumoto, A Place for Consideration of Culture in the American Criminal Justice System:
Japanese Law and the Kimura Case, 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 507, 523 (1995).
125. See Kimura, REUTERS, LTD., Oct. 19, 1985. available in LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library, Reuna File
[hereinafter REUTERS].
126. See id The defense also denied that cultural factors influenced the resulL See Stewart, supra note 119,
at B7, 1985 WL 2013333, at *7.
127. Feldman, supra note 122, at BI, 1985 WL 2025039, at *3.
128. See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
129. See generally, Anh T. Lam, Culture as a Defense: Preventing Judicial Bias Against Asians and Pacific
Islanders, 1 ASIN AM. PAC. Is. U. 49, 61 (1993).
130. Stewart, supra note 119, 1985 WL 2013333, at *7 (quoting Deputy District Attorney Lauren L. Weis).
131. See generally Matsumoto, supra note 124, at 526 ("Thus, even though culture was not [expressly
acknowledged] as a mitigating factor in the determination of Mrs. Kimura's criminal liability, the sentencing
judge, consciously or unconsciously, seemed to take this into account in accepting Mrs. Kimura's diminished
capacity at the time she committed her crime.").
132. REUTERS, supra note 125 (quoting prosecution spokesman Al Albergate).
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allowed in the courtroom. As Gerald Klausner, Kimura's defense attorney, stated,
her behavior was "psychological in origin, but cultural in direction. Culture shaped
or directed her actions."
133
The prosecution's purported "nonuse" of cultural evidence was a misuse of
cultural evidence. The cultural evidence was not, in fact, used to show that cultural
beliefs shaped Kimura's state of mind, but to prove that Kimura was mentally
unstable at the time of the offense. Kimura was not excused from her actions
because oya-ko shinju would have been excused in her home country; she was
excused because her adherence to oya-ko shinju was used to prove that she was
temporarily insane.' 3' Her temporary insanity, in turn, was the basis for her
substantive cognitive insanity defense'3 - and excused her actions.
B. People v. Chen
In People v. Chen," the defendant was accused of murdering his wife by
hitting her in the head eight times with a claw hammer after learning that she was
having an affair. The defense argued that Chen's cultural background resulted in his
"diminished capacity" to form the intent necessary for premeditated murder. 37
Under New York law, a person is guilty of second degree murder when, "[w]ith
intent to cause the death of another person, he [or she] causes the death of such
person or of a third person,"' 38 or he or she "recklessly engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to another person"'139 and causes such death under
circumstances that evince a "depraved indifference" to human life.' 4 A person is
guilty of first degree manslaughter when, "[w]ith intent to cause serious physical
133. Sherman, supra note 81 (quoting defense attorney Gerald L. Klausner).
134. See Lamn, supra note 129, at 61.
135. See Renteln, supra note 1, at 462 & n.89, 463.
136. No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Super. Ct., Mar. 21, 1989) (unpublished decision). For a discussion of this
unpublished case, see Goldstein, supra note 1, at 151; Renteln, supra note 1, at 439, 480-81.
137. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 152. "The term 'diminished capacity' is used and misused to describe
two different concepts .... Frst, there is a mens rea form of diminished capacity." DRFssLER, supra note 4,
§ 26.01, at 335. This form acts as a failure of proof negative defense. See id "As such, it ought to be, but is
not, recognized as a potential basis for exculpation for any crime." Id "Partial responsibility" is the second form
of diminished capacity, and functions as a partial affirmative defense. See id 'Recognized now in only a few
states, and only for the crime of murder, this defense mitigates a criminal homicide to manslaughter." Id It
appears that the "diminished capacity" defense argued in Chen was a mens rea failure of proof negative defense.
For further discussion of the two types of diminished capacity defenses, see id § 26, at 335-45; Renteln, supra
note 1, at 465-71.
It should be noted that diminished capacity and provocationi'heat of passion" defenses are very different
defenses. Not only is the diminished capacity defense usually a negative defense and provocation an affirmative
defense, but, while provocation can include "any 'violent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion,' ...
including fear, jealousy, and 'wild desperation,"' DRESSLER, supra note 4, § 31.07, at 490 (citations omitted),
provocation also requires that the actor be an "ordinary person" with an "average disposition ... and [a] normal
mental capacity." Id at 493. A defendant seeking to show that he or she "had abnomal human frailties...
might support a diminished capacity claim, [but such claim would be] out of place in a provocation defense."
Id at 494 (citation omitted).
138. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1) (McKinney 1987). First degree murder applies only to specified situations
not relevant to the Chen case. See id. § 125.27 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1997).
139. Id § 125.25(2).
140. See id
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injury to another person, he [or she] causes the death of such person or of a third
person" 141 or, "[w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, he [or she]
causes the death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do
not constitute murder because he [or she] acts under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance.'. 42 "The fact that homicide was committed under the
influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance
reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree .... .,'43 A person commits
second degree manslaughter when he or she "recklessly causes the death of another
person."'
144
Chen was originally charged with second degree murder. 45 The judge,
however, found him guilty of the lesser charge of second degree manslaughter after
hearing testimony that Chinese culture condemned adultery. 146 The second degree
manslaughter charge signifies that Chen did not intend to kill his wife, but acted
"recklessly" thereby causing her death. 47 The facts-hitting his wife eight times
in the head with a claw hammer'4--demonstrate that Chen intended to kill his
wife, or, at the very least, that he intended to cause his wife "serious physical injury"
(the requisite intent for first degree manslaughter' 49). Nevertheless, the judge
sentenced Chen to five years probation on the second degree manslaughter charge
after hearing testimony that, in traditional Chinese culture, a wife's adultery is proof
that her husband has a weak character."5 The defense lawyer argued that
"[m]arriage is a sacred institution in China .... When there is this kind of
[adulterous] situation, the attendant shame and humiliation is magnified a
thousandfold.'' Chen's lawyer further claimed that "the basis for the defense
was not that it's acceptable to kill your wife in China. The basis of the defense is the
emotional strain based on cultural differences and the state of the defendant's
mind."'152 The defense attorney explained that cultural pressures provoked Chen
into an extreme mental state of "diminished capacity," leaving him without the
ability to form the intent necessary for more serious charges of premeditated
murder.153
The judge found that Chen was "driven to violence by traditional Chinese values
about adultery and loss of manhood. '' "M In ordering probation, the judge cited the
141. I. § 125.20(1).
142. Id. § 125.20(2).
143. Id.
144. Id. § 125.15(1).
145. See Choi, supra note 1, at 85.
146. See Celestine Bohlen, Holtzman May Appeal Probation for Immigrant in Wife's Slaying, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 1989, at B3, available in LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
147. See generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15(1) (McKinney 1987).
148. See Chiu, supra note 2, at 1053.
149. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
150. See Chiu, supra note 2, at 1053, 1114.
151. Leslie Gevirtz, Immigrant Gets Probation for Killing Wife, U.P.I., Mar. 31, 1999, available in
LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library, UPI File (quoting defense attorney Stewart Orden).
152. 1& (quoting defense attorney Stewart Orden).
153. See Goldstein, supra note 1. at 152 (quoting defense attorney Stewart Orden); see also supra note 137.
154. Goldstein, supra note 1, at 152 (quoting Jetter, supra note 89. at 4).
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"cultural aspects, the effect of his wife's behavior on someone who is essentially
born in China, raised in China, and took all his Chinese culture with him to the
United States."' 55 The court further stated that Chen's cultural background was
"something that made him crack more easily. That was the factor, the cracking
factor."'1
56
Both the Chen and Kimura cases illustrate a misuse of cultural evidence. In both
cases, cultural evidence should have been used to establish the lack of mens rea
required for the crime charged. In Kimura, however, the evidence, although not
formally admitted, was used to establish temporary insanity and thereby excuse the
defendant's actions.' 57 Cultural evidence was not used to negate the requisite mens
rea for the offense charged or to establish "heat of passion"; instead, it was used to
establish mental illness.
Similarly, cultural evidence in Chen was used, not to show that the defendant was
more enraged due to cultural influences than an "Americanized" individual, but to
excuse his actions.'58  There was no evidence to support a finding of
"recklessness." Consequently, a proper use of cultural evidence would only have
mitigated Chen's crime to manslaughter in the first degree.
V. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF ADMISSIBILITY
OF CULTURAL EVIDENCE
Generally, the trial judge makes the threshold determination whether to permit
expert testimony,' 59 and has broad discretion regarding its admissibility."6
Accordingly, it is the judge who determines the admissibility of cultural evidence,
either to negate or mitigate the mens rea element of the crime charged. The judge
may also evaluate cultural evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial to
determine the existence of mitigating circumstances.' 6' In addition, both the court
and the prosecutor may consider cultural evidence in the plea bargaining phase to
permit the defendant to plead guilty to a lesser offense.'
155. Gevirtz, supra note 151 (quoting Judge Edward Pincus).
156. Bohlen. supra note 146, at B3.
157. See supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text.
158. See Chiu, supra note 2, at 1101.
159. Many states have statutes that provide for an evidentiary hearing out of the presence of the jury. See,
e.g., N.M. R. EvID. 11-104(A); OHIo R. EViD. 104(A). In California, section 402 of the Evidence Code, provides
that "when the existence of a preiminary fact is disputed," the court "may hear and determine the question of
the admissibility of evidence out of the presence of hearing of the jury." CAL EVID. CODE § 402 (West 1995).
160. See generally, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also Scott v. Yates, 643
N.E.2d 105 (Ohio 1994); People v. Schor, 516 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. Crim. CL 1987); State v. Catsam, 534 A.2d
184 (Vt. 1987); State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751 (Or. 1984).
161. See Cultural Defense, supra note 1, at 1295. In his dissent in United States v. Yu, 954 F.2d 951, 956
(3d Cir. 1992), Judge Becker stated that a person's ignorance based on cultural differences might be considered
a mitigating factor at sentencing for two reasons. First, the defendant's conduct may be more understandable than
similar conduct by someone familiar with the laws of this country and, second, the defendant may be less likely
than an ordinary offender to repeat the offense. See id For a discussion of cases involving the issue of ancestral
background in sentencing, see generally Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., National Origin and Ethnicity in Sentencing, 9-
Fall CIUM. JUST. 26 (1994); see also Gomez, supra note 104.
162. See Maguigan, supra note 100, at 57; see also Cultural Defense, supra note 1, at 1295.
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Expert testimony regarding cultural practices is problematic because of the
difficulty inherent in defining "culture."' 63 Culture is, by its very nature,
constantly in a state of flux," constantly evolving. Therefore, culture is prone to
varying interpretations regarding the existence and prevalence of any given
practice.165 Due to the persuasive nature of expert testimony' 6 and the potential
misuse of this type of evidence, the judge, in exercising her discretion, must have
a framework to evaluate the admissibility of cultural evidence and ensure its
accuracy.
A. FRE Rule 702-Reliability
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.' 67
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted Rule 702 to mean that an expert's
testimony must be both reliable and relevant.'" Many states have adopted the
equivalent of Rule 702 in their penal codes."6 Therefore, before admitting expert
testimony regarding cultural evidence, a trial judge must determine whether such
evidence is reliable. 7 In making this determination, the judge must evaluate such
factors as the qualifications of the testifying expert, the research upon which the
expert testimony is based, and the nature of the testifying expert's knowledge.' 7'
163. See discussion supra Part M.B; see also supra notes 99-102.
164. See supra note 101.
165. See supra note 102.
166. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993). The Daubert Court stated that
"[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it Because
of this risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules
exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses." lit (quoting Judge Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence Is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)).
167. FED. R. EVID. 702.
168. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 591. Daubert, by its own terms, applies only to scientific expert
testimony. See id at 590 n.8.
169. See, e.g., FtA. STAT. ANN. § 90.702 (Harrison 1996); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 702 (West 1995); N.M.
R. EVID. 11-702; VT. R. EviD. 702.
170. Federal Rule of Evidence 104 provides that:
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence
of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of subdivision (b) [pertaining to conditional admissions]. In making its
determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
FED. R. EvID. 104(a). Many states have similar rules. See, e.g., OIno R. EvID. 104(A), 702. Cf. State v. Foret,
628 So.2d 1116, 1127 (La. 1993) (holding that child psychologist's testimony using dynamics of Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome to diagnose whether abuse had occurred did not pass threshold test for
admissibility).
171. See, e.g., Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So.2d 322 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1991) (holding that an
expert on grief and bereavement who had a Ph.D. in sociology, had been researching grief for fifteen years, and
had taught at numerous seminars was properly permitted to testify as an expert in the field); Porter v. State, 576
P.2d 275 (Nev. 1978); State v. Valencia, 575 P.2d 335 (Ariz. 1977); State v. Brown, 564 P.2d 342 (Wash. 1977).
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The decision whether an expert witness has the necessary expertise and qualifica-
tions to testify is within the trial judge's discretion172 and will not be disturbed on
appeal unless clearly erroneous or prejudicial to the adverse party. 173
An expert witness' "'[kinowledge' connotes more than subjective belief or
unsupported speculation."' 74 The expert must have some basis for the testimony
being presented and must have some knowledge superior to that possessed by an
ordinary juror.' Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
"[p]roposed [expert] testimony must be sup,,orted by appropriate validation-i.e.,
'good grounds,' based on what is known." ' 76 The Daubert Court stated that the
trial court must make a "preliminary assessment of ... the reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony [of a scientific expert witness to ensure that
it] is scientifically valid and ... [to assess] whether that reasoning or methodology
properly can be applied to the facts in issue."' 7 The Supreme Court suggested that
trial courts consider whether the scientific technique has been subjected to peer
review and/or publication,' the known or potential rate of error,"7 the
existence of standards controlling the technique's operation,18° the technique's
refutability,' and the general acceptance of the technique in the scientific
community."s
A determination of the reliability regarding cultural evidence should, similarly,
hinge upon the reliability of the social science reports, publications, and other
documentation being presented. For example, the defense presentation of the
Hmong marriage ritual in People v. Moua is criticized as misrepresenting the
cultural practice at issue.'" In People v. Moua, the Hmong defendant was accused
of kidnapping and raping a Hmong woman." The defendant argued that his
actions were part of a Hmong marriage ritual.' 6 The only cultural data presented
by the defense, however, was a twenty-two page pamphlet which contained only
superficial descriptions of a few types of Hmong marriage practices and cited only
172. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93; see also People v. Schor, 516 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438, 440 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. 1987).
173. See Scott v. Yates, 643 N.E.2d 105, 107 (Ohio 1994) (citing Alexander v. Mt. Carmel Med. Ctr., 383
N.E.2d 564, 565 (Ohio 1978)); see also State v. Catsam, 534 A.2d 184, 188-89, 195 (Vt. 1987); State v. Brown,
687 P.2d 751, 775 (Or. 1984).
174. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
175. See OHIO R. EviD. 702; OR. R. EVID. 401,403,702; TEX. R. CRim. EVID. 702; see also Shelburne, 576
So.2d 322; Schor, 516 N.Y.S.2d 436; Commonwealth v. Seese, 517 A.2d 920 (Penn. 1986).
176. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
177. Id at 592-93.
178. See id at 593.
179. See id at 594.
180. See id
181. See id at 593.
182. See id at 594.
183. Case No. 315972-0 (Fresno Super. Ct. 1985) (unpublished decision) (cited in Renteln, supra note 1, at
445 n.19).
184. See Evans-Pritchard & Renteln, supra note 2, at 20.
185. See Chiu, supra note 2, at 1115; see also Evans-Pritchard & Renten, supra note 2, at 2-3.
186. See Chiu, supra note 2, at 1115; see also Evans-Pritchard & Renteln, supra note 2, at 9-12.
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one reference.'" The cultural evidence presented was, in other words, not of the
calibre that would normally pass muster under the standards required under Daubert
for admissibility of scientific expert testimony.
188
Moreover, because culture is constantly evolving, definitions of "cultural
practices" are particularly susceptible to an expert's subjective interpretation. 89
For example, the expert in People v. Chen was an anthropologist who testified in the
nonjury murder trial that, although he did not know the defendant, he "knew" the
defendant's culture."9 He did not cite any cases where Chinese men had killed
their adulterous wives, but said he knew of violent incidents. 91 His testimony was
constructed from romanticized and fetishized relics of a mystical, ancient, and
fictional China."9
The expert's testimony in Chen has been attacked by legal commentators as an
inaccurate depiction of Chinese culture.'93 The expert claimed that "[i]n the
Chinese context, divorce is virtually the end .... It could be the end of a person's
real life."'' " He further testified that while "Americans" were familiar with
divorce, it is a "remarkable thing to [the Chinese] still. We are at two extremes ....
To a Chinese, it is a matter of great concern and it's uncommon."19' In actuality,
given the rise in the number of divorces in China today,19 modern Chinese society
no longer stigmatizes divorces. 97 According to a recent survey, less than 12% of
Chinese believe that divorce is disgraceful. 98 The expert's testimony revealed
outdated patriarchal and racist stereotypes." His testimony was not supported by
187. See Evans-Pritchard & Renteln, supra note 2, at 20. The authors state that "the cultural circumstances
of [People v. Moua] were not sufficiently explored or understood before a decision was reached" as
demonstrated by the "confusion between two Hmong methods of marrying-elopement and abduction-which
were [both] referred to as 'marriage by capture."' Id. at 29-30.
188. See Catherine Trevison, Changing Sexual Assault Law and the Hmong, 27 IND. L. REV. 393 (1993);
see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590, 592-95 (1993).
189. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 166 ("Many experts will express differing or possibly inaccurate views
based upon their own subjective study").
190. See Leti Volpp, (Mis)ldentifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense," 17 HARv.
WoMEN's LJ. 57, 57 (1994); see also Goldstein, supra note 1, at 151 (describing the expert testimony in Chen).
191. See Volpp, supra note 190, at 70.
192. See id at 68 n.51 (The expert's testimony "fetishized 'difference' as a way to anchor the 'foreignness'
of the 'Chinese,' and structured his 'Chinese friends' as native informants.").
193. See id at 66-76; Maguigan, supra note 100, at 94.
194. Volpp, supra note 190, at 69 n.55 (quoting anthropologist and defense expert Burton Pastemack in
Chen, No. 87-7774, Record at 55-56) (second alteration in original).
195. 1d at 71 n.64 (quoting anthropologist and defense expert Burton Pasternack in Chen, No. 87-7774,
Record at 76) (second alteration in original).
196. See Survey Shows Divorce Rising Among Chinese, CHIL TRmB., Oct. 11, 1992, at 5, available in
WESTLAW, CHITRIB database, at *I [hereinafter Divorce Rising] (reporting that the Chinese divorce rate has
more than doubled in the 1980s); Divorce Loses Stigma with 10% Annual Rise, BBC SUMM. OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, Oct. 8, 1992, available in LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File [hereinafter Divorce
Loses Stigma].
197. See Divorce Loses Stigma, supra note 196.
198. See Divorce Rising, supra note 196, at 5, WESTLAW, CHITRIB database, at *2.
199. Tsiwen Law, a Philadelphia lawyer and former president of the Philadelphia chapter of the Asian
American Bar Association, stated that the expert testimony in Chen was "an outdated version of the [Chinese]
culture .... Under the feudal system, misuse of a spouse may have been acceptable. But now in China, you
can be prosecuted." Polman, supra note 2, at Al, 1989 WL 2933827, at *9-*10 (quoting Tsiwen Law). Professor
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reliable reports or contemporary social science studies, but on fieldwork that he had
conducted between the 1960s and 1988. °
Many argue that the cultural expert's testimony in Chen illustrates the necessity
of excluding cultural evidence in order to eliminate the risk of reinforcing harmful
stereotypes."° While there is a real possibility that cultural evidence will further
racist stereotypes, an absolute ban on cultural evidence is an overreaction. While
cultural evidence presents an actual risk of stereotyping, it is also inaccurate and
ethnocentric to presume that all cultures are similar to "American" culture. Rather,
the courts must scrutinize the evidence being presented to ensure that it accurately
reflects the culture from which it is purported to originate. The reliability and
accuracy of the data used to support the existence of the cultural evidence being
presented will increase the accuracy and the reliability of the cultural evidence itself.
For example, the Japanese-American community's widespread support for Fumiko
Kimura diminished the likelihood that the evidence regarding parent-child suicide
was based upon stereotyped or racist assumptions of Japanese culture. W2
Finally, the susceptibility of cultural evidence to racist stereotyping can be
minimized by "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction on the burden of proof .... ."' Thus, the value of the expert's
testimony in Chen might have been diminished had the prosecution challenged the
accuracy of the evidence.' Instead, the prosecution failed to introduce any expert
testimony challenging the validity of the cultural evidence presented.' ° Assistant
District Attorney Kenneth Rigby, who handled the case, said he did not think it was
necessary-"[i]n our wildest imaginations, we couldn't conjure up a scenario where
the judge would believe that anthropological hocus-pocus."'
By contrast, in People v. Chou, ' the jury rejected the "cultural defense" in
large part because of the testimony presented by the prosecution's expert
Sharon K. Horn of the City University of New York Law School, who has taught law in China, states that the
testimony in Chen "reinforces patriarchal and racial stereotypes-which don't even exist in China today."
Patricia Hurtado, Killer's Sentence Defended: "He's Not a Loose Cannon," N.Y. NEWSDAY, Apr. 4, 1989, at
17, 1989 WL 3369661, at *5 (quoting Professor Sharon K. Horn).
One commentator deconstructs the Chen expert's depiction of the Chinese and examines his method of
"creating an unrecognizable 'other' which enables the "anthropologist 'expert' to subordinate members of the
foreign culture through descriptive control." Volpp, supra note 190, at 62.
200. See generally Volpp, supra note 190, at 70.
201. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 166 (arguing that "social science did not offer a correct cultural
representation in the Chen case").
202. In contrast, much of the conflict in People v. Moua involved the veracity of the cultural claims. See
Evans-Pritchard & Renteln, supra note 2, at 4. "[A]lithough the charge under American law was 'rape', the
defense asserted that the Kong Moua was following the traditional Hmong 'marriage by capture' ritual." Id. The
facts, however, demonstrate that neither set of words "captures precisely what transpired." Id
203. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
204. Professor Maguigan cautions against using the Chen case as a basis for concluding that receiving
evidence of traditional patriarchal values will necessarily lead to an outcome which validates those values in light
of the prosecution's failure in Chen to present rebuttal evidence. See Maguigan, supra note 100, at 78.
205. See id
206. Polman, supra note 2, at Al, 1989 WL 2933827, at *11 (quoting Brooklyn Assistant District Attorney
Kenneth Rigby).
207. See generally Pankratz, supra note 7; see also Lindsay, supra note 7.
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witness.' Chou's attorneys argued that Chou, accused of shooting and killing the
victim, was driven to seek revenge because he had "lost face" after a fight a year
prior to the shooting.0 9 Yet, Dr. Freda Cheung, a psychologist with the University
of California at Los Angeles, testified that Chou never would have confronted the
victim in a public place if he were concerned about "face. 210 Apparently, Dr.
Cheung's testimony was sufficient to convince the jury that the defendant was not
genuinely acting as a result of cultural pressures.
B. FRE Rule 401-Relevancy
In addition to being reliable,2 ' expert testimony must be relevant. Rule 401
of the Federal Rules of Evidence states that "'[r]elevant evidence' means evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence. 2 3 Many states have statutes similar to Rule 401.214
Cultural evidence is relevant only insofar as the defendant's state of mind is
relevant to the crime. Consequently, expert testimony regarding the defendant's
cultural background should not be used when the defendant is charged with a strict
liability crime. Furthermore, the defendant must establish that he or she should be
permitted to take advantage of the cultural defense. In other words, the defendant
must establish that he or she is someone who is influenced by the traditions and
practices of his or her home country.2 5 In determining the extent of the
defendant's biculturation,216 the judge may consider such factors as the
defendant's age, education, length of residency in the United States, nature and
length of employment, adherence to traditional practices other than the cultural
practice at issue, language ability, and relationships with individuals of different
208. See Lindsay, supra note 7, at A15, 1995 WL 3195616, at *1-*2.
209. See Pankratz, supra note 7, at B1, 1995 WL 6566996, at *1-'3.
210. See id Dr. Cheung also testified that loss of face among the Chinese "never justifies shooting a man
in the heart." Id. at B1, 1995 WL 6566996, at *2.
211. In addition to providing reliable expert testimony, the accuracy of cultural evidence is affected by the
court interpreter's ability to translate the testimony of the defendant and other witnesses. See Evans-Pritchard
& Rentein, supra note 2, at 18-19.
Professors Evans-Pritchard and Rentein discuss the difficulty of finding a qualified court interpreter in People
v. Moua. See id at 18. ("Judging by the transcripts, the court interpreter's ability to translate from Hmong into
English was in question. His clumsy phrasing of the witness's words did little to clarify the facts for the...
judge .... [The interpreter] was also interpreting the facts of the case without reference to what the witness was
saying.").
212. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751 (Or.
1984).
213. FED. R. EVID. 401.
214. See, e.g., N.M. R. EVID. 11-401; OR. REV. STAT. § 40.150 (1995).
215. This requirement is similar to that required in cases where battered women kill their batterers. Before
expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome can be introduced, the defendant must establish that she is a
"battered woman." See Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 9 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
216. "[A] bicultural person is someone who 'has had extensive socializaton and life experiences in two
cultures and who participates actively in these cultures."' Evans-Pritchard & Rentein, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting
Kathryn Rick, An Investigation of the Process of Biculturation with Hmong Refugees 25 (1988) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of Colo.)).
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cultural backgrounds.217 If, after carefully considering the relevant factors, the
judge determines that the defendant is successfully acculturated into "American"
society,2" cultural evidence would not be relevant to the defendant's case.
People v. Wu2 9 illustrates the difficulty courts have with determining the
relevancy, and thus admissibility, of cultural evidence. In that case, the defendant,
Helen Wu, strangled her son to death after learning that her husband was having an
affair.' The relevance of the cultural evidence in Wu depended in large part upon
the requisite state or states of mind for the crime or crimes charged. Under
California law, first degree murder requires that the defendant have an intent to kill,
and that the defendant acted with premeditation, deliberation, and malice
aforethought."1 Second degree murder does not require premeditation, but does
require malice aforethought.' Voluntary manslaughter is the intentional killing
of a human being without malice aforethought.'m Involuntary manslaughter is
defined as an unintentional killing "in the commission of an unlawful act, not
amounting to felony."'
The prosecution's theory of the case was that the defendant killed her son out of
anger at his father.2" The defense's theory was that the defendant killed her son
because she thought that he was ill-treated and she wanted to take care of him in the
afterlife.' There was no dispute that the defendant intentionally killed her
son.' Therefore, the crimes for which the defendant could be convicted were first
degree murder, second degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter. The relevant
mental states for these crimes according to the court, thus, were premeditation and
deliberation, malice aforethought, and specific intent to kill.2' Accordingly,
cultural evidence should have been introduced only if it could have helped prove the
existence, or non-existence, of any or all of the above mental states. " 9
At trial, experts on transcultural psychology testified that, in their opinion, Wu
"was acting while in an emotional crisis ... and that her emotional state was
217. See i& at 6 ("The extent of successful biculturation among Hmong refugees depends on such variables
as age, education, and length of residency in the United States."); see also Lamn, supra note 129, at 51
(establishing four categories to be used in determining the applicability of cultural evidence to the defendant).
218. The judge also should examine the cultural beliefs proffered to see if a true conflict exists between the
defendant's cultural beliefs and the dominant society's cultural beliefs. See supra notes 96-97.
219. 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (CL App. 1991). The California Supreme Court, in denying review of the Court of
Appeal's decision, ordered that the Court of Appeal's decision be not officially published. See id. at 868 n.*.
220. See IS at 877. People v. Wu is an extremely complicated case. For an in-depth discussion of Wu, see
Renteln, supra note 1, at 472-74.
221. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West Cum. Supp. 1997), § 187(a) (West 1988).
222. See id § 187(a); see also People v. Butts, 46 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1965).
223. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(a) (West Cam. Supp. 1997); CAL. JURY INSTR. ClIM. 8.40 (West Cum.
Supp. 1990) (definition of voluntary manslaughter).
224. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1997).
225. See Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 870 (decision ordered to be not officially published).
226. See id
227. See generally i. at 883. The issue was not whether Wu intended to kill her son--she did-but, whether
she killed her son out of revenge or for cultural reasons.
228. See i.; see also supra notes 222-224.
229. See Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
Winter 1997]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
intertwined with, and explainable by reference to, her cultural background." ° Wu
was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to a prison term of fifteen
years to life."' On appeal to the California Court of Appeals, Wu argued that the
trial court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on her theory
of the case which included consideration of her cultural background. 2
Wu requested the following instruction:
You have received evidence of defendant's cultural background and the
relationship of her culture to her mental state. You may, but are not required to,
consider that the [sic] evidence in determining the presence or absence of the
essential mental states of the crimes defined in these instructions, or in
determining any other issue in this case.233
The prosecutor objected to the instruction because it was a non-pattern jury
instruction and there was no appellate law concerning instruction on "cultural
defenses."' The trial court refused to give the instruction, stating "that it did not
want to put the 'stamp of approval' on [the defendant's] actions in the United States,
which would have been acceptable in China. '235
The California Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision and stated
that the jury should have been instructed that it could consider evidence of the
defendant's cultural background.' The court of appeals noted that it "is error for
a court not to give an instruction if that instruction is both correct in law and
applicable on the record; it is not error if either condition is lacking." 237 Under
California law, the trier of fact may consider any admitted evidence. 238 The court
of appeals noted that the prosecutor never objected to the admission of evidence
concerning the defendant's cultural background. 9 Thus, the court of appeals
explained, the issue on appeal was not whether cultural evidence was relevant, but
"on what issues was such evidence relevant."2 °
230. Id at 884. Wu argued that she was acting in an automatistic, fugue state of consciousness. See Renteln,
supra note 1, at 473. Automatism is an affirmative defense. See Robinson, supra note 40, at 242; see also
Rentein, supra note I, at 474.
231. See Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 869; see also Rentein, supra note 1, at 473.
232. See Wu, at 869-70; see also Renteln. supra note 1. at 473. Wu asserted an automatism defense and a
cultural defense, "although the two are clearly linked." Rentein, supra note 1, at 473. The trial court failed to
give jury instructions on either defense. See Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 869-70; see also Renteln, supra note 1, at 473.
The trial court did recognize the relevancy of a provocationi"heat of passion" defense. See Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr.
at 883. The California Court of Appeals agreed that cultural evidence was relevant to a provocationt"heat of
passion" defense. See id.
233. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 879-80.
234. Id at 880.
235. Id
236. See id at 887; see also Renteln, supra note 1, at 473. In denying review, the supreme court ordered that
the opinion be not officially published. See Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 868 n.*. "Despite the depublication, Helen
Wu was entitled to a new trial. On retrial she was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Sentencing was delayed
in order to give prison officials more time to evaluate her case and Wu eventually received the maximum
possible sentence for voluntary manslaughter-eleven years." Rentein, supra note 1, at 474 (citations omitted).
237. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 882 (quoting People v. Benson, 802 P.2d 330 (Cal. 1990)).
238. See id. at 883 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 351).
239. Id. at 883.
240. I&
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The court of appeals, in deciding whether cultural evidence was relevant to
proving the applicable mental states, was essentially determining the admissibility
of any cultural evidenceY2' Because the cultural evidence had already been
admitted at trial, and was uncontested by the prosecution, the court of appeals was
forced to frame the broader admissibility issue as pertaining to the application of
admissible evidence.242 In other words, despite its statement to the contrary, the
court of appeals discussion of "on which issues" the cultural evidence was relevant
was, in fact, a discussion of whether the cultural evidence was relevant and
therefore, admissible, at all.243
The court of appeals attempted to distinguish between the relevance of the
cultural evidence, and the relevance of the cultural evidence to the defendant' s state
of mind.' The cultural evidence, however, would not, or should not, have been
admitted as relevant if it did not concern the defendant's state of mind.
Under this Article's proposed framework, the trial judge in Wu should have
determined whether the cultural evidence was relevant to proving any of the mental
states required for homicide. As previously mentioned, under California law first
degree murder requires premeditation, deliberation, and malice aforethought.'5
The prosecution's theory was that the defendant had planned to take revenge on her
husband by killing their son.' Cultural evidence was relevant in establishing that
the defendant acted under "heat of passion" at the time of killing her son. "Heat of
passion" negates the malice intent required for both first and second degree murder
and reduces an intentional killing to voluntary manslaughter.247 The facts and
circumstances must have been sufficient to arouse the passions of an "ordinarily
reasonable man."' There is both an objective and a subjective element to
voluntary manslaughter. The objective element requires that the "heat of passion"
must be due to "sufficient provocation."' 9 There is, however, no specific type of
provocation required by Califomia Penal Code section 192.' The subjective
element requires that the defendant acted under the "actual influence" of a strong
passion at the time of the killing.2'
As the California Court of Appeals noted, the expert testimony concerning the
defendant's cultural background was relevant in explaining the source of the
defendant's stress and in explaining how statements made by the defendant's son,
in light of all the facts and circumstances, constituted "sufficient provocation"
241. See id at 883-85.
242. See id at 883.
243. See id
244. See id
245. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187, 189 (West Cum. Supp. 1997).
246. See Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
247. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1997); Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 883; People v.
Wickersham, 650 P.2d 311 (Cal. 1984).
248. Wickersham, 650 P.2d at 321.
249. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
250. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West Cum. Supp. 1997); see Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 884 (quoting trial court
(quoting People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 780 (Cal. 1976) (in banc))).
251. See Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
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causing the defendant to kill her son in a "heat of passion.""s In other words,
cultural evidence could. have shown that an ordinarily reasonable Chinese woman
would have reacted the way the defendant had, even if an ordinarily reasonable
"American " woman would not have reacted similarly.
C. FRE Rule 403-Probative Value and Prejudice-and the Effects of Cultural
Preemption
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence excludes relevant evidence "if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury .... ,", Many states have adopted
a statute similar to Rule 403.2 The potential for unfair prejudice, confusion, or
misleading the jury is compounded where the evidence sought to be introduced is
cultural. "Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the
difficulty in evaluating it"253 and because of the aura of credibility that often
accompanies it.' It is precisely because of this risk that the judge exercises more
control over expert witnesses in weighing possible prejudice against probative force
under Rule 403. 7
The amorphous nature of culture lends itself to both confusion of the issues and
misleading of the jury. Labeling a practice as "cultural" implies that it is an inherent
and intrinsic part of the society which purportedly practices it. The rationale
underlying the recognition of a cultural defense rests, in large part, upon the notion
of self-determination.258 All cultures are equal and all peoples should have the
ability to determine for themselves to what norms and traditions they wish to adhere.
Our society values cultural diversity because of the richness it brings to the
existing culture and because of the historical premium placed upon an individual's
freedom of choice in the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness. 9 The United
252. d
253. FED. R. EVID. 403.
254. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 90.403 (Harrison 1996); IDAHo R. EVlD. 403; LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art.
403 (West 1995); N.M. R. EViD. 11-403; OR. R. EvID. 403.
255. Weinstein, supra note 166; see State v. O'Key, 899 P.2d 663, 672 (Or. 1995) (Evidence perceived by
lay jurors to be scientific in nature possesses unusually high degree of persuasive power and should therefore
be supported by appropriate scientific validation.).
256. See, e.g., State v. Rodgers, 812 P.2d 1208, 1212 (Idaho 1991) (holding that the expert interpretation of
blood splatter evidence would not cause jurors to be over-impressed by an "aura of reliability"); Spencer v.
General Electric Co., 688 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 (E.D. Va. 1988) (holding that the victim could not introduce
expert testimony of "posttraumatic stress disorder" to prove the occurrence of rape because "its aura of scientific
basis renders it unfairly prejudicial"); State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751, 773 (Or. 1984) (discussing the potential
misuse and overvaluation of polygraph evidence).
257. See Weinstein, supra note 166, at 632.
258. Professor Karst argues that constitutional doctrine "makes two promises to members of racial, religious,
and ethnic minorities. First, it promises them the opportunity to participate in our public life as equal citizens
while maintaining such ties to the minority cultures, as they may choose." Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to
Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REv. 303, 306 (1986). Second, because such
paths are available to them, "members of minority groups are to have the opportunity to choose to identify with
the cultural norms of the larger society." I,
259. See id at 336-40.
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States Constitution's guarantees of freedom of religion and association,' in
particular, preserve and protect a newcomer's traditional values and customs. There-
fore, a failure to consider a defendant's cultural background essentially punishes the
defendant for coming from a cultural background that differs from an Anglo-Ameri-
can culture. Consequently, advocates of a cultural defense argue that in order to pro-
mote respect for other cultures, cultural background evidence should be admissible.
In reality, however, cultures often are defined, not by the masses of a particular
society, but by the power elite in that society. The premium that United States
society places upon tolerance and individual liberty should not be diminished when
the oppressor in another society becomes a member of a marginalized group in
United States society. Labeling a practice or tradition as "cultural" may be a general-
ization which defines a practice of political, economic, or social domination which
is forced upon the subordinated group rather than created and developed by it."1
I use the term "cultural preemption" to refer to the systemic usurpation, by
economic, social, or political means, of the power to define one's own culture. The
subordinated group's ability to define and shape the culture of the society in which
it exists is essentially preempted by the existing power structure, including coercion
and persecution by the government, societal pressure to maintain the status quo, and
insufficient resources. 262 Because in most societies, most women are subordinated
to most men,263 women comprise the group which is most often culturally
preempted. In many cases, the efforts of women to define and maintain a cultural
identity are life-endangering.2 Not surprisingly, the cases involving a cultural
defense often involve practices that harm women. 265
260. See U.S. CONST. amend I.
261. One legal commentator argues that the criminal law should not permit defenses that "perpetuate bigotry
and inequality." Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibility, and Angry Young Men: Reflections
of a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 433, 481 (1994-95).
262. See id. at 480. Smith argues that crimes involving cultural offenses are often "committed by a member of
a dominant group which asserts its domination through criminal conduct, encouraged at every turn by various
cultural influences that support its power, victimizing those who are already subordinated within the culture." Id
See also Spatz, supra note 85, at 633. Spatz explains that "[t]he shortcomings of local women's groups are the
result of insufficient staff and funding, the inability of local groups to convince the government to change, and the
pressure on such groups to focus on immediate concerns." ld
263. See Spatz, supra note 85, at 628 (stating that "all societies 'devalue' women" and citing as examples
female infanticide in China and sex selective abortions in India).
264. See Mahnaz Afkhami, Identity and Culture: Women as Subjects and Agents of Culture Change, in FROM
BAsIc NEEDS TO BAsIc RIGHTs 227 (Margaret Schuler ed., 1995). "Algerian women have been threatened with
physical mutilation and death for objecting to fundamentalist propositions to curtail [women's] rights. In Sudan.
Egypt, Morocco, and Pakistan women are increasingly under attack." lI
For example, many African and Asian women reject the notion that the practice of female genital mutilation must
be understood in a "cultural context" Nafis Sadik, a Pakistani physician who heads the United Nations Population
Fund, states that "[n]o value worth the name supports the oppression and enslavement of women .... The function
of culture and tradition is to provide a framework for human well-being. If they are used against us, we will reject
them." Barbara Crossette, Female Genital Mutilation by Immigrants Is Becoming Cause for Concern in the U.S.,
N.Y. TmES, Dec. 10, 1995, at A18, available in, LEIS/NEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
265. However, this is not always true. See, e.g., People v. Kimura, No. A-091133 (Los Angeles Super. Ct.,
Nov. 21, 1985) (unpublished decision) (cited in Renteln, supra note 1, at 462 n.88); People v. Wu, 286 Cal.
Rptr. 868 (Ct. App. 1991) (opinion ordered not officially published) (cited in Renteln, supra note 1. at 472
n.131); see also Renteln, supra note 1, at 503-04. "It is important to realize that women in some cases, e.g.,
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The danger of cultural preemption is exacerbated by the subordinated group's
lack of access to the media and other modes of communication to the outside world.
The way a particular society is perceived, and thus the definition of that society's
"culture" by the outside world depends in large part on the ability to disseminate
information to that outside world.'
Additionally, a cultural practice of subordination may be in the process of a slow
and difficult reform.'s Slavery, for example, was defended for many years as
being an integral part of southern "culture." This definition of southern culture
changed as the values and perceptions of white Americans evolved. Furthermore,
slavery never would have been part of southern "culture" if African Americans had
not been preempted from establishing their own culture as the culture of the South.
Expert testimony may essentialize' the defendant's culture, and ignore the
beliefs and practices of disempowered subgroups within that culture.' Given the
difficulty in defining culture, the likelihood increases that expert testimony will, out
of necessity, provide a broad, simplistic characterization of the defendant's culture
rather than an accurate, contemporary depiction of the norms and mores that reflect
the social progress occurring in the defendant's home country. The expert testimony
may focus on history and tradition and ignore the efforts of marginalized groups to
re-define the culture-efforts which are often thwarted by the government or
impeded by a lack of political or financial resources.270
Fumiko Kimura and Helen Wu, have benefitted immensely from the willingness of judges to consider the
cultural facets of their cases." Id at 503. Furthermore, the cultural defenses in Kimura and Wu involved practices
which harmed children.
266. For example, as African women became more media visible, the characterization of clitoridectomies as
human rights abuses gained acceptance. Abdel Halim states that the earliest efforts to eradicate clitoridectomies
started in the Sudan almost fifty years ago. See Asma Mohamed Abdel Halim, Rituals and Angels: Female
Circumcision and the Case of Sudan, in FROM BASIC NEEDS TO BASIC RIGHTS 249, 250 (Margaret A. Schuler
ed., 1995). These efforts were hindered by taboos surrounding sexual behavior and a societal resistance to the
education of women. See id at 250.
In the late 1950s and the 1960s, the Sudanese Women's Union launched a campaign challenging the health
hazards of clitoridectomies. The campaign did not attract widespread attention because many Sudanese thought
the campaign addressed a "private issue" that should not be discussed in public. See id
267. The evolution of cultural practices includes religious practices. One commentator notes that even in
societies where religious fundamentalism appears particularly strong, the status of women is improving. "The
reason is that despite the existing obstacles an increasing number of women have become conscious of
themselves as authentic individual human beings independent of their kinships and community relations and
increasingly insist that others acknowledge this fact." Afkhami, supra note 264, at 228.
268. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND
GENDER 238-42 (Katherine T. Bartlett & Roseanne Kennedy eds., 1991). Professor Harris defines "gender
essentialism" as "the notion that a unitary, 'essential' women's experience can be isolated and described
independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience." Id. at 238. 1 use the term
"essentialize" here to describe the characterization of a culture based upon the characteristics of the dominant
culture, without regard for the various subcultures which comprise a society.
269. One commentator argues that the expert testimony presented in the Chen decision presented a version
of "Chinese culture" that "privileged race over any consideration of gender oppression." Volpp, supra note 190,
at 76. Volpp states that "[the expert's] perspective was 'male,' obviating the possibility that a woman, and
specifically a Chinese immigrant woman, might describe divorce, adultery, and male violence within 'Chinese
culture' very differently." Id
270. The Sudanese Women's Union, for example, was banned for eighteen years due, in large part, to the
political instability in Sudan. See Halim, supra note 266, at 250-51.
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To minimize the prejudicial effects of cultural preemption, a judge should weigh
four factors in determining whether the probative value of the evidence is
outweighed by its potential to mislead jury members or confuse the issues: (1) the
purpose of the cultural practice; (2) the moral culpability associated with the cultural
practice; (3) the deterrence/educational value of prohibiting the cultural evidence;
and (4) alternative forms of sentencing.
First, the judge should examine the purpose of the cultural practice. If the
purpose of the practice is to perpetuate the subordination of a particular group,271
such as women,272 the danger of cultural preemption increases. The practice,
deemed "cultural" by an expert for the defense, may be viewed by women from that
particular society as merely a means of male domination.273
271. Some may argue that the definition of a "subordinated" group is subject to arbitrary categorization.
Professor Mari Matsuda has responded to this criticism by stating that
[t]o conceptualize a condition called subordination is a legitimate alternative to denying that such
a condition exists. In law, we conceptualize. We take on mammoth tasks of discovery and
knowing. We can determine when subordination exists by looking at social indicators: wealth,
mobility, comfort, health, and survival tend to mark the rise to the top and the fall to the depths.
Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320,2362
(1989).
272. One commentator cautions that the value of multiculturalism should not be confused with cultural
relativism which justifies abuse of women based upon cultural norms. See ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLosiNG OF THE
AMEMCAN MIND (1987).
273. Asma Mohamed Abdel Halim, a Sudanese lawyer working to eradicate the practice of genital mutilation,
commented on the disingenuity oflabeling oppressive practices "cultural": "My culture has changed much for men.
We women are always kept the same .... Men who are dressed in three-piece suits will tell us not to dress in
Western clothes." Charlotte Grimes, Women Press U.N. on Rights, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 3, 1993, atCl,
available in WESTLAW, Alnews database, 1993 WL 8024364, at *5 (quoting Asma Mohamed Abdel Halim).
Even American-born women of color are often preempted from defining their cultural identity. Many are accused
of betrayal by their communities for trying to find ways to end practices of male domination and abuse. See Rivera,
supra note 85, at 249. Rivera explains:
[I1f a Latina decides to go beyond the perimeters of her community and seek assistance from
outsiders-persons already considered representatives of institutional oppression-the
community may view her acts as a betrayal. A Latina, therefore, may tolerate abuse rather than
call for outside help. This hesitance to seek assistance provides the community with an excuse
for ignoring or denying violence against Latinas, as well as for trivializing and resisting Latina
activists' efforts to create a community strategy to end the violence.
Id.; see also Chiu, supra note 2, at 1120; Maria Ontiveros, Three Perspectives on Workplace Harassment of Women
of Color, C989 ALI-ABA Proc. 259 (Mar. 26, 1995). Chiu states:
The ultimate trap for a woman of color is the casting of gender power against racial solidarity,
a deep conflict that underlies the cultural defense debate. Should she choose gender over race,
she is spurning cultural and racial affinity for white feminism. Should she remain silent, she
legitimizes sexism in her community. Like African American women who oppose patriarchy in
their community, Asian American women who reject the subordination of women in the Asian
American community are roundly excoriated as race traitors or as lackeys for white feminists.
Chiu, supra note 2, at 1121 (footnotes omitted). Ontiveros notes that the Anita Hill hearing
reinforced the perception that any woman who raises the issue of sexual oppression in the black
community is somehow a traitor to the race, which translates into being a traitor to black men.
It is particularly disheartening knowing that probably a lot of black people took this stance
despite believing Anita Hill. They who decided that standing behind a black man--even one
with utter contempt for the struggles of African-Americans-is more important [than] supporting
a black woman's right not to be abused.
Ontiveros, supra, at 268 (quoting Barbara Smith, Ain't Gonna Let Nobody Turn Me Around, MS., Jan.-Feb., 1992,
at 37, 38).
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Imagine a defendant, arrested for wife battering, who argues that he did not
realize battering was against the law. An expert for the defense testifies that,
although illegal in the defendant's home country, domestic violence is the single
greatest cause of injury to young women and batterers are often not punished.274
The expert, of course, is testifying on behalf of an "American."'  Although
domestic violence is unfortunately and admittedly a part of United States
276 Anecsociety, most American women (and men) would be unwilling to define
battering as an "American cultural practice."
The prevalence of a particular practice alone does not constitute an accurate or
acceptable means of proving a "cultural" practice.2" In many cases, evidence that
a particular practice is prevalent, combined with the exoticization of another society,
results in mis-categorizing a practice as a valid cultural one, rather than as a means
of domination.278
Second, and closely tied with the first factor, is the moral culpability 9
associated with the cultural practice.W In Kimura, for example, the purpose of
parent-child suicide is to save the child from societal ostracization. Fumiko
Kimura's moral culpability is not the same as that of a mother who, in retaliation
against her adulterous husband, vindictively kills her child.281
274. See Sarah M. Buel, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence, 11 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 213 (1988); Lisa
R. Beck, Note, Protecting Battered Women: A Proposal for Comprehensive Domestic Violence Legislation in
New York, 15 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 999 (1987); Rivera, supra note 85, at 249.
275. Approximately two to four million women in the United States are victims of domestic violence each
year. See Elizabeth A. DeLahunta & Asher A. Tulsky, Personal Exposure of Faculty and Medical Students to
Family Violence. 275 JAMA 1903 (1996), available in WESTLAW, MAGSPLUS database, 1996 WL 11243015,
at *1-*2; see also Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Symposium, Q: Does the Violence Against Women Act Discriminate
Against Men?, INsIGHT MAoAZINF, May 27, 1996 at 25, available in WESTLAW, MAGSPLUS database, 1996
WL 8311172, at *4-*6; Ariella Hyman et al., Laws Mandating Reporting of Domestic Violence: Do They
Promote Patient Well-Being, 273 JAMA 1781 (1995), available in WESTLAW, MAGSPLUS database, 1995
WL 10027577, at *1-'2; Linda K. Meier & Brian K. Zoeller, Taking Abusers to Court: Civil Remedies for
Domestic Violence Victims, TRL4., June 1, 1995, available in WESTLAW, MAGSPLUS database, 1995 WL
15142678, at *1-*2; Antonia C. Novello et al., A Medical Response to Domestic Violence, 267 JAMA 3132
(1992). available in WESTLAW, MAGSPLUS database, 1992 WL 11637463, at *1-*2.
276. Studies indicate that 50% of all women in the United States will suffer some form of domestic violence
at some time in their lives. See sources cited in supra note 275; see also LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED
WOMAN ix (1979).
277. See Smith, supra note 261, at 480 ("With few exceptions, cultural defenses dredge up the worst aspects
of the culture at large.").
278. For example, the trial judge in Chen fell prey to his exoticization of Chinese culture when he
uncritically accepted the expert's testimony without first considering the transitional nature of modem day China.
See generally Maguigan, supra note 100, at 77-78.
279. See David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 388 (1976).
Professor Gomez states that, in cases where the defendant's cultural background is a significant factor in the
crime committed, the sentencing judge should consider the offender's culpability. See Gomez, supra note 104,
at 360. A sentencing judge often takes into consideration an individual assessment of the defendant's moral
culpability. See, e.g., United States v. Barker, 771 F.2d 1362, 1365 (9th Cir. 1985).
280. For an interesting discussion of the application of moral education theory to cultural defense cases, see
Lisa A. Smith, The Moral Reform Theory of Punishment, 37 ARmZ. L. REV. 197 (1995).
281. Apparently, even Fumiko Kimura's husband believed that her actions were motivated by love and not
vengeance. Upon learning of his son's death, Fumiko Kimura's husband, Itsuroku, reacted with "grief, guilt--and
forgiveness, even saying that he envied the strength of the bond his wife had with his children." Michael Reese,
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In many cases, the moral culpability of the cultural practice may differ depending
upon how the purpose of the cultural practice is characterized. For example, some
would argue that clitoridectomies are intended to preserve family unity, whereas
others would argue that the practice is intended merely to control a woman's
sexuality. In such cases, the judge would have to balance the harmfulness of the
practice with its purported benefit.
The growing number of women who are seeking asylum in the United States in
order to escape genital mutilation highlights the extent of cultural preemption in
many countries where the practice is prevalent. 2 It also causes one to question
the sincerity of those who claim that deference for cultural diversity precludes an
examination of the morality of any cultural practice, even when it occurs within the
United States.2 3 The disempowerment experienced by immigrant women is
compounded when they arrive in the United States because many of them speak
little or no English, and are often without emotional or financial support.'4 As a
result, the vulnerable position of immigrant women in United States society
warrants a more critical appraisal of the cultural practice at issue.'
The third factor to consider in determining the admissibility of cultural evidence
is the effect on the purposes and premises underlying the criminal law. More
specifically, what effect would admission of the evidence have on the
deterrence/education goals of the criminal law? Permitting evidence on a cultural
practice, such as wife battering, that perpetuates the subordination of women, and
demonstrates moral culpability, might send a message to others in the defendant's
community that observing the practice will not be punished. On the other hand,
A Tragedy in Santa Monica, NEWSWE, May 6, 1985, at 10, available in LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library,
NWEEK File.
282. See Keith Donoghue, A Rite of Passage, THE RECORDER, Jan. 18, 1996, at 1, available in
LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library, RECRDR File.
283. For example, Daniel Stein, executive director of the anti-immigration Federation for American
Immigration Reform in Washington, D.C., opposes asylum for women fleeing genital mutilation, ostensibly
because, "[i]t is our Western notions of civilized behavior that are imposing themselves on ... age-old practices
....." Id at 13 (quoting Federation for American Immigration Reform executive director Daniel Stein). His
concern of cultural imperialism appears disingenuous, given his anti-immigration agenda.
284. See K. Connie Kang, Forum to Focus on Spouse Abuse Among Asians Conference, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
27, 1994, at B3, 1994 WL 2339034, at *2 ("Incidents of domestic violence are as prevalent among Asian
Americans as among other groups in this country, but Asian victims-especially immigrants-face added
obstacles because of ignorance and language and cultural barriers ...."). Estelle Chun, a family law specialist
at the Asian Pacific American Legal Center of Southern California, states that "[a]s tragic as spousal abuse is
for white women, born here ... with friends and relatives, you just can't compare that to [the plight of]
immigrant women .... They have no money, they don't speak English-they don't even know how to take the
bus." Id, 1994 WL 2339034, at *3 (first omission in original) (quoting Estelle Chun).
285. Professor Crenshaw notes that "[i]mmigrant women generally have limited access to ... resources
.... Moreover, sometimes cultural barriers may further discourage women from reporting or escaping battering
situations." See Kimberli Williams Crenshaw, Transcript, Panel Presentation on Cultural Battery, 25 U. TOLEDO
L. REV. 891, 894 (1995). Professor Crenshaw adds that immigrant women may be especially vulnerable to
spousal abuse due to fear of deportation and language barriers which limit their ability to utilize social support
services. See id at 894-95.
See also Anna Y. Park, The Marriage Fraud Act Revised: The Continuing Subordination of Asian & Pacific
Islander Women, 1 AsIAN AM. PAC. Is. LJ. 29 (discussing the domestic violence in the Asian and Pacific
Islander communities).
Winter 1997]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
preventing the use of the cultural defense to excuse the defendant's behavior sends
a clear message that the behavior is unacceptable in this society. For example, many
Hmongs in Fresno followed the "marriage-by-capture"/rape trial closely.2" As a
result of the publicity, many Hmongs are modifying their traditions to conform with
the United States legal system.' By contrast, it is unlikely that a woman
contemplating parent-child suicide will be deterred by the legal penalty that will
await her should she fail.
In determining the deterrence/educational value of prohibiting cultural evidence,
the judge should evaluate different approaches that promote both the criminal justice
system's deterrence and individualized justice objectives. Thus, while cultural
evidence may not be permitted to negate the defendant's intent, it might mitigate the
sentence. The guilty verdict would send a clear message to the defendant's
community that the particular cultural practice is not acceptable, but, at the same
time, the sentence would be tailored to fit the defendant's culpability.
The fourth factor is that the judge might also consider alternative forms of
sentencing. Instead of sending a guilty defendant to prison, the defendant could be
sentenced to community service, educating other members of his or her community
that the cultural practice at issue is criminal. The increased awareness within the
defendant's community would diminish the likelihood that, in the future, a member
of the community would continue the cultural practice not knowing of its
wrongfulness by American legal standards.ss At the same time, the sentence
would not punish the defendant unfairly for committing a crime that he or she had
no idea was wrong. Some cities are already responding to the need for education.
Police officers with the multilingual Asian Task Force in Los Angeles and the
Hmong Task Force in the Fresno Police Department are attempting to inform Asian
communities about United States laws.'
Finally, the admissibility of cultural evidence under Rule 403 does not hinge upon
any single factor, but depends upon a careful consideration and weighing of all
aforementioned factors. For example, a judge could find that the purpose of
clitoridectomies is to control a woman's sexuality, yet find that a woman who has
performed the practice on her children is not morally culpable because she truly
believed that she was acting in the best interests of her children. On balance,
however, the judge might still exclude the cultural evidence because the defendant's
lack of moral culpability is outweighed by the purpose and deterrence
considerations.
VI. ANTICIPATED OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The proposed framework will probably raise many objections. At the risk of "pre-
empting" opposing views, this section addresses some of the anticipated objections.
286. See Mark R. Thompson, Immigrants Bring the Cultural Defense Into U.S. Court, WALL ST. J., June 6,
1985, available in WESTLAW, Alinews database, 1985 WL-WSJ 251041, at *6.
287. See id
288. One legal commentator states that an effective educational program could reduce or eliminate the need
for a cultural defense by ensuring a well-informed and "morally" educated public. See Smith, supra note 280,
at 208.
289. See Thompson, supra note 286, 1985 WL-WSJ 251041, at *6.
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Perhaps the strongest opposition to the proposed framework may come from those
who argue that to judge the morality of a cultural practice is "hubristic and
ethnocentric."2' This criticism overlooks that the cultural practice is being
"judged" because it is being practiced within United States borders. The value of
cultural diversity does not occupy a privileged position in relation to other
"American" values. The relativist position is out of place in a discussion about the
treatment of criminals in the United States. As a sovereign nation, the United States
is at liberty to determine its citizens' values and rights. It is precisely because a
cultural defense is consistent with the goals of United States society that it should
be recognized. Many nations do not recognize a cultural defense. By contrast,
judging the morality of cultural practices performed in other countries would raise
legitimate concerns about ethnocentricism. 29
1
Some may question the wisdom of granting broad judicial discretion in cultural
"defense" cases. Under the third "balancing" prong of the framework (Federal
Evidence Rule 403 and this Article's proposed factors), the judge must determine
the effects of cultural preemption by exercising moral judgment regarding the nature
and purpose of the cultural practice at issue. Those who fear that the proposed
framework gives judges too much discretion ignore that judges already have a great
deal of discretion.2' Judges have always infused their idea of morality into their
decisions. The rules of law are often expressed in language that is vague, broad, and,
consequently, prone to subjective interpretation.293 Criminal cases often require
subjective interpretations of "intent" due to the murky concept of "mens rea," as
noted in Part lI.A. The admissibility of evidence under existing evidence codes
varies based upon the ideological and philosophical inclination of the presiding
judge.29
290. See Smith, supra note 280, at 208.
291. Unfortunately, the international human rights community is often too quick to relegate women's rights
issues as "cultural" and therefore "private," even when the state is involved in the violation. Consequently, the
human rights community is reluctant to criticize many of the practices which violate women's human rights. Lori
Heise, of the Women's Global Leadership Center at Rutgers University, states that "[t]raditionally, there's been
a distinction between pubic and private violence. A man raping a woman might be a crime but not a human
rights violation. Women respond that prosecutors don't prosecute, police don't protect-you have state
complicity, allowing it to continue with impunity." Grimes, supra note 273, at Cl, 1993 WL 8024364, at *5
(quoting Lori Heise). In many countries, however, local pressure is resulting in progress for women. Women
around the world have formed feminists groups. See generally Riane Eisler, Human Rights: Toward an
Integrated Theory for Action, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 287 (1987).
292. See BRUCE JACKSON, LAW AND DisoRDER 138 (1984) (discussing the broad discretion granted both
judges and prosecutors); Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1972).
293. See Walter W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Law, 33 YALE LJ. 457, 458 n.5
(1924); Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, I1 A.B.A. J. 357 (1925). In fact,
much of the Critical Legal Studies literature is devoted to exposing the subjectivity of the judicial
decisionmaking process. See generally PETER FTZPATRICK & ALAN HUNT, CRrTCAL LEOAL STUDIES 1 (Peter
Fitzpatrick & Alan Hunt eds., 1987); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57 (1984);
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976).
294. See Smith, supra note 261, at 492 ("Might judges be more willing to consider low mental capacity, a
history of sexual abuse.., in sex crimes than in other crimes? Do judges suddenly become enlightened about
the complexity of what causes individuals to commit crime when the crime is sexual assault upon a woman?").
Hopefully, this Article's proposed evidentiary framework will enable judges to make more uniform and
principled decisions about the admissibility and application of cultural evidence.
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Under cases interpreting Federal Rules of Evidence Rules 702 and 401, the judge
decides whether the evidence sought to be introduced is both reliable and relevant.
The United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.' stated that a judge, in determining the admissibility of scientific expert
evidence, must make a "preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue."29 The
Court acknowledged that judges are granted broad discretion in making this
determination, but stated that "[wie are confident that federal judges possess the
capacity to undertake this review. Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do
not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test."' Under Rule 702, the
judicial inquiry regarding the scientific validity of the proposed scientific expert
testimony is a "flexible one" which includes a variety of factors that may be, but
need not be, considered. 298
Furthermore, judges are already passing on the "morality" of cultural practices
and either excluding the evidence if they find the practice immoral, or excusing the
defendant's behavior if they find that the practice is not immoral, or not immoral
"enough." The judge's beliefs, prejudices, and ideological predispositions ultimately
determine what type of evidence will be admitted at trial and what type of
instructions will be given to the jury. Even the staunchest advocate of the law's
objectivity would be unwilling to argue that a presiding judge has no biases or that
ajudge's worldview has no effect on the outcome of an evidentiary hearing. Indeed,
many legal scholars argue that, far from being rational and objective, the law is
arbitrary and indeterminate.2' The proposed framework does not grant judges
more discretion than they already have; on the contrary, it checks their power by
exposing the subjectivity in their decisions. It forces judges to reveal their
decisionmaking process instead of permitting them to hide their racism and
misogyny behind their purported deference for cultural differences.
VII. CONCLUSION
As people from different countries come to the United States, many of whom do
not speak English and who are not familiar with the customs, traditions, and laws
of this nation, legal issues will arise with which the law, as it exists now, is ill-
equipped to deal. For example, how should the law treat a crime committed by an
individual who did not believe that the act that she or he committed was wrong? Our
traditional notions of "intent" no longer prove satisfactory. Without an adequate
consideration of the implications that arise as a result of the increasing diversity of
the United States population, and the changing needs of our society, the justice
system may prove to be "unjust."
295. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
296. Id. at 600.
297. Id. at 593.
298. See id. at 594-95 & n.12.
299. See Richard K. Greenstein, The Nature of Legal Argument: The Personal Jurisdiction Paradigm, 38
HASTINoS L. J. 855 (1987); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1960), construed in Ken Kress, Legal
Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REv. 283, 297 (1989).
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Opponents of the cultural defense argue that recognizing this defense will
undermine the purposes of the criminal justice system. Opponents argue that there
should be consistency and fairness in the law's application and that "ignorance of
the law is no excuse." Furthermore, opponents argue that permitting a cultural
defense will be tantamount to condoning the cultural practice and will undermine
the criminal justice system's deterrence and protection goals.
A limited use of cultural evidence, however, promotes, rather than undermines,
the objectives of the criminal justice system. The problems that have arisen as a
result of a "cultural defense" arise out of the application of cultural evidence.
Cultural evidence has either been wholly excluded or uncritically accepted.
This Article proposes a framework for evaluating cultural evidence which
conforms to the guidelines set forth under existing rules of evidence governing the
admissibility of expert evidence. Under the first prong of the framework, applying
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, a judge determines the reliability of the cultural
evidence being presented by evaluating the qualifications of the testifying expert,
the quality and extent of the research upon which the testimony is based, and the
nature of the testifying expert's knowledge. The second prong of the framework
requires that the judge, under Federal of Evidence 401, determine the relevance of
the cultural evidence by admitting such evidence only in cases where state of mind
is an element of the crime charged. In addition, the judge evaluates whether the
cultural evidence is relevant to this particular defendant by examining whether the
defendant has successfully acculturated into mainstream United States society and
determining whether there is a "true" cultural conflict. In determining the
defendant's acculturation, the judge is essentially evaluating the sincerity of the
defendant's claim that cultural factors influenced his or her actions.
The third prong of the framework requires the judge, under Federal Rule of Evid-
ence 403 and this Article's proposed balancing factors, to consider the pre-judicial
nature of cultural evidence in light of the problem of cultural preemption. In
evaluating the prejudicial nature of the evidence, the judge examines the purpose of
the cultural practice and the moral culpability of the defendant in carrying out the
practice. In addition, the judge considers the deterrence/educational value of prohibi-
ting the evidence in addition to any alternatives to sentencing. After a careful con-
sideration of all the factors comprising the third prong of the framework, the judge
determines whether the probative value of the cultural evidence would be out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury.
The proposed framework provides a mechanism by which to evaluate cultural
evidence within the confines of the United States criminal justice system. Because
most societies are comprised of dominant and subordinate groups, the recognition
of cultural diversity often results in the perpetuation of practices of subordination.
The proposed framework takes into consideration the problem of cultural
preemption while upholding the principles of cultural pluralism and individualized
justice.
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